

THE SHAPING OF AMERICA

A GEOGRAPHICAL
PERSPECTIVE
ON 500 YEARS
OF HISTORY



Volume 1
Atlantic America,
1492–1800

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We begin in Europe because it was the Europeans who reached across the Atlantic and initiated the radical reshaping of America. That outreach to and encounter with the American World was at once a sequence of events and a set of processes. We shall be concerned with both, but in a special and limited way. There is no need to rehearse all the rich history of the voyages of discovery and the trials of early colonization, for these have been recounted in a huge and splendid and continually expanding literature. Nor shall we attempt to assess and apply in any formal way the more specialized monographic treatments of the ways in which political, economic, and social institutions operated to initiate, sustain, and become themselves transformed by such transoceanic enterprise. We seek only for some landmarks that can guide a wide-ranging reconnaissance from which we can make a useful base map for this particular interpretation of the shaping of America.

Our theme is the creation of a vast Atlantic circuit, a new human network of points and passages binding together four continents, three races, and a great diversity of regional parts. We need to get a clear picture of just where those European thrusts came from, where they made connections with coastlands overseas, and what kinds of transformations they initiated. We shall hold to this oceanic focus until all of the major Atlantic societies of Europe have gotten something substantial under way across the seas. That will force us to find our way through at least a century and a half of increasingly complex activity and to try to discern some general patterns amidst the dense details of time and space.

1. America as a Continuation


In A.D. 1492 the last Muslim hold upon Iberia was broken and Columbus sailed forth and discovered America. After seven centuries of grinding effort the Spanish had burst through the final barrier and in an explosion of energy spanned an ocean to begin the conquest of a new world.

Such a statement is at once misleading and usefully symbolic. The fall of Granada and the voyage of Columbus were not deeply interdependent events. Granada was a mountainous remnant that had no essential bearing upon Christian ventures out into larger realms. If there was indeed a "burst through the barrier" it had come centuries earlier with the Castilian conquest of Andalusia when warriors from the lean highlands seized control of the richest lowlands, the very seat of Islamic civilization in the west. So too was the Columbus voyage the culmination of a long prelude of Iberian Atlantic reconnaissance and island conquests. Yet this superficial coincidence can be given significant meaning, for it was in thanksgiving for the fall of Granada that Isabella equipped Columbus's expedition, and it is quite appropriate to see the *reconquista* in Europe and the range of the *conquistadores* over the Americas as successive phases in the same broad movement: the powerful outward expansion of Western Christian society. Viewed at such a scale these events of 1492 do mark an ending in the Old World, a beginning in the New, and a convenient symbolic concatenation in the larger structure of history.

American beginnings of course involved more than Iberia, and to the north we can see a vaguely similar pattern wherein Cabot's voyage from Bristol in 1497 and the English and French enterprise that followed can be regarded as an overseas thrust by these peoples beyond their centuries-old Celtic frontiers. Viewed more closely, here too the actual patterns fail to sustain so simple a relationship, or indeed, any close similarities to Iberia. The British Celts had become Christians before their adversaries, and although their own rather different version of the faith had long ago been brought into basic conformity with the dominant Western pattern, in 1497 they were still a group of distinctive peoples holding out on the rainy rugged edge of Europe against the chronic pressures of the Normans and Anglo-Saxons; their conquest was not a prelude but a later integral part of this larger Atlantic history. Furthermore, the long delays and difficulties in getting anything firmly under way in the New World from this part of the Old hardly represent an explosive expansion but rather contrast starkly with the Iberian conquest of half the Americas in half a century.

Nevertheless, it is best to begin with the broader view: to see those first Spanish and Portuguese, French and English explorers, conquerors, and settlers as the vanguard of a common movement, the cutting edge of a powerful Romano-Germanic Christian culture that had burst out upon the World Ocean and would eventually bring the coastlands of every continent under siege.

It is also pertinent to see these two great Italian seafarers as emblematic of another important dimension within this broader context. For several centuries this Western Christian culture had also been thrusting eastward into Byzantine, Arabic, and Turkish waters. Now this variable Mediterranean combination of crusade and commerce was being redirected westward to lands beyond the Ocean Sea. Columbus, a Genoese financed in large part by fellow Genoese residing in Seville, and Cabot, a Genoese native and Venetian citizen long experienced in the eastern trade, were only the most famous figures among the thousands of seafarers and entrepreneurs who turned from the Mediterranean to the Atlantic and thereby forged a deep and complete continuity between the earlier and later phases of this great European outreach.



1. The North Atlantic Basin

All Atlantic-bordering European societies were advantageously located for the outreach to America. The general conformation of the North Atlantic and its circulations of water and winds lay open a very extensive and complicated coastline—reaching from the corner of Brazil to Labrador—to relatively ready access from any of the Atlantic ports of Europe. Within that broadly elliptical basin the ocean currents move clockwise, accompanied by relatively steady northeasterly trade winds on the south and the much more variable but prevailing westerly winds in the north. Mariners quickly learned to make use of this natural circulation: southwesterly outbound directly into the American Indies, returning northeasterly, arching parallel with the trend of the North American coast. Therefore this entire continental seaboard and the attenuated archipelago shielding its tropical seas became a single arena of action for the competition of Atlantic Europe. For more than two centuries events in one sector might ramify into others with important impact thousands of miles away on this western rim. Thus, even though we are concerned ultimately with the United States, this entire North Atlantic littoral is the necessary beginning framework.

But position is only a potential. Transatlantic operations called for unprecedented vision and vigor, initially from a few score persons, eventually from a much larger body if anything significant was to be sustained. Although news of the discoveries quickly reverberated through the maritime systems of western Europe, not all societies were equally well prepared for American adventures.

Clearly the first requisite for transatlantic operations was *seafaring*. All Atlantic European societies made use of the sea, but not all were equipped to extend the range of their operations so drastically. Still there were at least half a dozen local maritime districts, from Andalusia to the Bristol Channel, which had the seaworthy vessels, the skilled mariners and craftsmen, the facilities and hinterland resources, and the commercial connections to undertake ventures across the ocean. Those long engaged in the North Atlantic fishery as far north as Iceland could readily extend their reach to the Grand Banks, for this required no major alteration of routine practices. Transatlantic exploration, seasonal bartering, and coastal plundering could be carried out by individual entrepreneurs and small corporate associations backed by no more than local home resources. Such parties may have sought state approval, carried the flag, and laid claims in the name of the Crown, yet they were not essentially dependent upon state support.

But although the American seaboard was visibly empty along many stretches, it was not uninhabited. A European foothold, a trading post or exploration base, might be negotiated or even forced upon local Indians without great effort but anything larger would eventually meet strong resistance. Most of these European Atlantic societies were deeply predatory, quite ready to push in upon and plunder anything to their advantage. But again, not all had so institutionalized predation

as to apply it toward effective control. Buccaneers might win a battle but the security of a large area required garrisons of soldiers under orderly administration, which in turn required (even if indirectly) the participation of the state much more critically. *Conquest*, the forced imposition of European rule upon American peoples, marked the initiation of true imperialism and represented a marshaling of far greater resources and more elaborate institutions than did sporadic bartering and plundering. The possibilities for such a successful extension of the state itself were obviously dependent upon a far greater complex of factors. We might well assume that those societies most freshly and extensively experienced in the conquest of territory and the governing of captive peoples would be the most likely to have eager visions of new conquests and proven institutions ready at hand, and thus be the most likely to seize upon and make the most of American opportunities.

Conquest may yield plunder and some exaction of tribute but it does not insure long-range returns. And of course the common American experience was that a coastal territory might be conquered only to have the native people withdraw into the interior, or die from new diseases introduced unwittingly by their conquerors, or disintegrate as a society and quickly diminish as a population from forced labor and brutal treatment. When such was the case, the only hope of realizing a benefit from conquest was to bring in a new labor force to work the land. Whether making use of African slaves, European bondsmen, or wage laborers, such an economy required local subsistence and support that could only come from the *planting* of settlers to cultivate the land, establish industries, and provide essential services. This true colonization demanded an even greater range of resources, institutions, and appropriate states of mind than mere conquest. Initial success in such transplantations had little to do with size or any assumed "surplus" of populations in the home country. All these European societies had potential colonists, but the recruitment of settlers and the support of an expanding European society overseas were fraught with enormous difficulties, and here again we may assume that experience counts, that those societies which had recently been involved in the colonization of new ground would be in the best position to make the first effective implantation of European civilization on American shores.

Seafaring, *conquering*, and *planting* may be taken as convenient labels for three kinds of activities undertaken by various European societies overseas. They can also be taken as three phases in the European encroachment upon the American seaboard, for seafaring is the obvious first essential and conquest a necessary prelude to any extensive planting. And since the planting of European settlers is clearly the most direct and effective means of rooting European culture onto the American seaboard, we may take seafaring, conquering, and planting as three essential components in the accomplishment of that end. We can expect that those European societies best equipped with the facilities, institutions, and attitudes of mind appropriate to these three components would be the earliest

successful agents of that transfer, whereas a deficiency in any one would cause serious delays and difficulties.

This simple formulation is offered as a useful guide through a complex history, helping us to account for the great variations in responses and results in the decades following the discoveries. The variation that most attracts our interest at this point can be illustrated very simply: whereas only five years separate the voyage of Columbus out of Palos from that of Cabot out of Bristol, more than one hundred years separate the founding of Santo Domingo by the Spanish from that of Jamestown by the English. A quick review of these and some intervening ventures will not only illustrate the utility of our formulation but demonstrate some patterned interrelationships and provide the basis for a set of geographical generalizations about the whole process of transoceanic transfer and the interactions involved.

2. Iberian Initiatives

Columbus's sensational triumph of discovery and his dismal failure to accomplish anything substantial with what he discovered offers a telling application of our formulation, for the Columban voyages were an extension of seafaring and nothing more. That prior to his voyage Columbus was given such an extraordinary panoply of titles, authority, and rights to revenue over all that he discovered suggests that he was not expected to discover anything really extraordinary—a few more islands in the Ocean Sea perhaps, well beyond the Canaries and Azores. His expedition was capable of no more than limited barter or local plunder on encountering inhabited lands.

But of course discovery led to visions of conquest and exploitation. On his second voyage Columbus founded Isabella, an elaborate design for the first European town in the New World. It was not a success. As Carl Sauer noted, "He wished a capital befitting his new station and ordered the building of an unneeded town in a wrong location." His attempts to exploit resources and establish a sound polity and society were little more successful, and Columbus died without having laid the foundations for the empire he so strongly desired. Much of this failure may be laid to the man's own vanities and personal limitations, but it also illustrates the more general proposition that successful imperialism is not simply a ready extension from discovery. Columbus was an experienced seafarer but a novice at conquest and colonization.

Once the Spanish Crown came to realize that there really was a New World to the west instead of a few new islands, and as the failures of Columbus as an individual entrepreneur became manifest, all the experience and institutions of a heritage of conquest, resettlement, and orderly administration were brought to

bear upon these fresh opportunities. Which is to say that after the Columban ten-year prelude the reconquista, which after the fall of Granada had been carried by its centuries-old momentum on southward and projected westward across the Atlantic. It should be noted that Iberians had been gaining experience in combining seafaring, conquering, and planting for some years before Columbus in their subjugation of the Canary Islands. In this "trial laboratory of colonial matters," the indigenous people, the Guanches, resisted conquest, and Castille, which eventually obtained exclusive rights, had to replace various entrepreneurial efforts with more formal procedures. Parry notes that "in the Canaries, Spaniards served their first apprenticeship in the arts of colonial empire and had their first experience of converting and exploiting a primitive subject people." The apprenticeship was not in conquering and converting *per se*, but in doing so a thousand miles overseas against a people far different from the highly civilized Muslims. And the results were ominous. The liberty of baptized Canarians was recognized in law, but not always in fact. Those who resisted were fair game; thousands were sold into slavery and their lands taken by mainland opportunists (some of whom were themselves *conversos* who sought to escape the enmities and suspicions of home localities).

Thus the really firm beginnings in America date from Ovando's arrival in Santo Domingo in 1502 with a fleet of thirty vessels and twenty-five hundred men. Nicolas de Ovando, the experienced commander of a religious-military order in Spain, was sent as deputy of the Crown to be the governor general, the *adelantado* of the new *frontera*. He relocated and rebuilt his capital city (it had been destroyed by a hurricane shortly after his arrival) and founded a network of towns, all "a transplantation in general of the old Castilian municipality of the Middle Ages." Having administered large grants of conquered land and people in Spain, "he became the principal architect of the *encomienda* system in the New World." The Church was an integral partner in the process, founding missions, building churches, and, in 1512, forming the first American bishopric. Within a few years there were perhaps ten thousand Spaniards living in Hispaniola, a colony supported by local produce and wealth extracted through the forced labor of the conquered population, administered through the Audiencia (established 1511), and connected routinely by commerce with the Casa de la Contratación (formed in Seville in 1503 to control this new Atlantic traffic). The vigor of this Hispaniola establishment soon faded as a result of the destruction of its Indian base and powerfully centrifugal attractions toward the mainland. But it does illustrate how the limitations of the individual entrepreneur were quickly overcome by experienced leaders working with tested tools and acting with the strong support of an old imperial society long involved in conquest, resettlement, and the administration of newly acquired ground.

The Portuguese sequence was not in general dissimilar. Oceanic seafaring devel-

oped only after the capture in 1415 of Ceuta, a Muslim stronghold on the African shore of the Strait of Gibraltar. Here, too, there was a strong historical logic in support of expanding such a foothold upon the Moroccan coast, but Prince Henry, who "made discovery an art and science; and . . . voyaging a national interest," directed explorations far to the south to tap the trans-Saharan gold trade nearer its source. These led to the discovery of Madeira and the Cape Verde Islands, as well as the Azores lying directly west, all of which were colonized.

About 1470 the Portuguese discovered Fernando Po, Príncipe, and São Tomé, uninhabited islands near the equator in the Bight of Biafra, which were quickly developed for sugar production by Portuguese entrepreneurs. Meanwhile they established trading stations and a few strong forts at key points along the African coast. Some attempts were made to evangelize the natives and to open diplomatic relations with African princes. But any hope of colonization was thwarted by the high mortality of Europeans due to African tropical diseases. Thus the Portuguese mainland venture remained primarily a coastal trading operation dealing in gold, slaves, and ivory. In this Atlantic and African prelude to their American enterprise the Portuguese displayed their superior skills in seafaring and an efficiency in planting without having to undertake much conquering.

Brazil had been discovered about 1500, but with more attractive commercial opportunities in Africa and India the Portuguese engaged in no more than occasional coastal bartering. When colonization was initiated in 1532, out of fear of French encroachment, it was done under the auspices of the Crown according to a comprehensive plan modeled on the "captaincy system already successfully tried in the Atlantic Islands." But the American mainland proved a rather more formidable environment than those benign Atlantic islands. The Indians often vigorously resisted their invaders and refused to provide a reliable labor force. Most of the *donatarios*, the proprietary landlords who were granted extensive hereditary powers in return for carrying out conquest and colonization, found the demands far beyond their skills or means. Some were repelled by the Indians; others failed for lack of colonists and profitable exports. The major early successful venture, in Pernambuco, drew upon fresh Portuguese tropical experience by the direct transfer of the sugar plantation and slave system from the Cape Verde and the Biafran islands. But in Brazil as in Hispaniola, more general success came only after the replacement of individual overlordship with a much larger measure of state control. The arrival in 1549 of Martin Afonso de Sousa, appointed to the new post of governor general and accompanied by several members of the new Jesuit order as well as a thousand colonists (many of them exiles), marks the beginning of much more direct initiative by the Crown and the Church, a shift analogous to that carried out by Ovando in Hispaniola nearly half a century earlier.

We can see this emergence of Brazil, therefore, as the culmination of more than a century of Portuguese seafaring, conquering, and planting, and a direct geo-

graphical extension of operations on the Atlantic islands and the African coast to this easternmost promontory of America. We can also see that the firm founding of Portuguese America lagged several decades behind that of Spanish America. This was certainly in part due to the greater commercial attractions of Africa and Asia. But their early Brazilian efforts also suggest that perhaps the Portuguese were less well prepared than the Spanish for conquest and planting on a continental scale. Their reconquista was further back in history, their recent colonization had been mainly on empty islands, and their national policies were more geared to overseas commercial adventuring than to systematic conquest and incorporation of land and people by state and church.

Nevertheless, both powers displayed an ability to carry forward a prodigious imperial enterprise, and that surely was related to their common Iberian and Atlantic experiences, which had given them a cast of mind and a set of institutions, military, civil, and ecclesiastical, by which they could implant their versions of civilization firmly on American shores long before their northerly neighbors in Atlantic Europe.

3. The Creation of New Spain

The American empire of Spain was indeed a prodigious creation—by 1600 it was a geopolitical structure extending from the Río Grande del Norte to the Río de la Plata at the southern portal to Peru—but it was not simply an extension of European civilization across the high seas. If it was clearly Spanish (or, more specifically, Castilian) in concept and control, it had become distinctly Spanish-American in content and direction: a vigorous new hybrid from the intense encounter between old and unlike peoples.

The conquest itself was clearly a direct continuation of traditional processes, displaying both the freedoms and formalities of the reconquista. Thus the rapid, wide-ranging forays through the West Indies and mainland margins in search of riches to plunder and natives to exploit were a repetition on a larger stage of Iberian border warfare and the Canaries conquests, carried out in large part by adventurers on their own initiative and resources, outrunning any close supervision of the state. Yet leaders of major expeditions sought crown approval of their projects and confirmation of their gains; consequently, the imposition of a formal imperial system routinely followed in the wake of their conquests.


The initial thrusts into the American tropical seas were simple extensions. The lands and the inhabitants were neither a formidable challenge nor a powerful lure. Hispaniola, Puerto Rico, Cuba, and all the lesser islands were essentially a greater Canaries, a larger archipelago across a broader sea, the Arawaks and Caribs, like the Guanches, a primitive race to exploit or expel. Thus, in a macrocultural sense

the real discovery of America was made in 1519 when Hernando Cortes broke in upon the core of the Aztec empire in the high-lying Valley of Mexico. Here amidst the mountains of Mesoamerica was a truly new world of peoples and cultures, an old civilization of great cities and rich countryside, many languages, and millions of citizens organized within a complicated set of theocratic and military states that shared a long, tumultuous history. Here was something more like the complex world of the Mediterranean than the simple insular scatterings of the Atlantic and the American tropical threshold.

And indeed, the early pattern of this imperial creation bears some likeness to that of the Roman conquest of the Greek world, wherein a simplified universal order was imposed upon a rich sociopolitical diversity. Thus the standardized Castilian conquest system, drawn out of its last great proving grounds in Andalusia and Granada and brought to bear upon the dense complexities of this American civilization, resulted in a New Spain which "at no point in its history" could be accurately characterized as simply "a Spanish society transplanted in the New World"; within a single generation it had all the marks of what all the world would come to recognize as distinctly "Mexican." The historical parallel must not be pushed too far. The Spanish impress upon America was greater than that of the Romans upon the Greeks, not because of an intrinsically more powerful imperial system but because a series of devastating epidemics reduced the Meosamerican indigenous population from more than twenty million to perhaps two million or less after the first century of contact.

Such drastic spasmodic depletions accompanied by the small but continual influx of Europeans radically altered the balance between the two peoples and forced them ever more closely together. The Crown originally defined a dual society, making the Indians wards of the state as a means to protect what rights they were to have and to provide an orderly basis for changes to be imposed, especially their conversion to Christianity. But the human substance of this legally defined *republica de los indios* dwindled so rapidly and the opportunity and need for drastic reorganization of the economy and society were so great that Indian and Spaniard were soon so intermingled and interdependent that miscegenation and acculturation resulted in a single complex hybrid creation in which Spanish formal institutions and systems were dominant but coexisted with and were increasingly articulated to an underlying folk culture, now much depleted and altered but everywhere vital and locally influential.

The richly developed Indian agriculture remained the principal basis of subsistence for much of the population, but the Spanish brought in wheat and barley, together with Andalusian plows and oxen, and established sugar plantations, vineyards, and other horticultural activities. The most profound change was the introduction of European cattle, sheep, swine, horses, burros, and mules. Thus a distinctive new Euro-American agricultural complex was rapidly formed, provid-




2. New Spain, to c. 1630.

ing an enriched subsistence, new industries, and even more surpluses for export to labor-poor colonies such as Cuba and Hispaniola. To the north, beyond the margins of Mesoamerican civilization, in the drier open lands of the Gran Chichimeca of the "barbarian" hunters and gatherers, the balance was far more European than native American. Here a ranching industry geared especially to supplying the mining districts with cattle and mules was established, drawing directly upon the resources and systems of the Iberian Meseta, the only area of western Europe where the management of large herds of cattle on horseback had been developed.

The Spanish intensively probed that north in search of precious minerals, making a series of discoveries of rich silver deposits, and establishing a number of great mining camps, as at Guanajuato, San Luis Potosí, Zacatecas, and far to the northwest at Parral, nine hundred miles from Mexico. Exploitation of these coveted resources required vast programs of regional development, involving the conquest of the local Indians in a series of destructive wars, the importation of laborers as well as whole colonies of Indians from the south to establish farms and provide stability, the organization of extensive systems of transport and supply, and the founding of many towns.

"The Spanish empire was an empire of towns." The municipality was the basic unit in the territorial hierarchy and the physical town was the anchor and focus of social and political life. "If the great symbol of the English colonist is the frontiersman clearing the land, the symbol of the Spanish colonization should be the *adelantado* pacing out the grids of a Spanish town." This rectangular plan with central plaza, varied in scale and detail but standard in general form, became one of the great instruments of conquest and colonization, defined in the basic codes. It had not been routinely applied in the *reconquista* and was not derived from any common form of Spanish town. But the idea was as old as the Romans; there were a number of examples of such plans in Iberia (whose lineage is probably traceable to the French *bastides* in the twelfth-century recolonizations just across the Pyrenees); and the design had been used by Castille for at least two new towns just prior to Columbus's voyage. Thus Ovando laid out Santo Domingo according to this general plan, Cortes superimposed it upon the ruins of the Aztec capital at Tenochtitlán, and within a few years it was being so routinely used for so many new settlements that a century later the grid-pattern town—full of houses roofed in red tiles, focused on a central plaza, the whole overshadowed by church or cathedral—had become the great symbolic landscape of Spanish America.

Such towns were full of varieties of people representative of this great encounter and sustained contact. In all of the larger centers there would be several different Indian groups, some representing displacements, migrations, or new associations



3. Santo Domingo, 1671.

Although Santo Domingo's prosperous days were long past, this depiction of the oldest European city in the Americas, published 169 years after its founding, displays a fine example of the common Spanish plan and the wealth and status of an early colonial capital. The cathedral, in which Christopher Columbus's bones were eventually interred, was begun in 1514, completed in 1540. The impressive stone castle at the river's edge was begun by the discoverer's son Diego, who was appointed governor in 1509. The first settlement was on the opposite bank of the Rio Ozama, where fields are shown. The plate is from *De Nieuwe en Onbekende Weerld* by Arnoldus Montanus, and the appearance therein of views of this and other cities of the American tropics reflects the Dutch dominance in the seventeenth century. (Courtesy of John W. Repts)

from a wide area, and these were further varied by differing degrees of acculturation to Spanish forms as displayed in clothing, coiffure, language, and participation in civic life. By 1600 a large proportion of the urban population was of mestizo or *mulatto* origin, and such mixtures were so common and so complex as to defy any simple gradation of social status. Those of apparently pure European ancestry asserted and largely maintained social dominance, but these, too, became divided between those born in Spain (*peninsulares*) and those born in America (*criollos*), the latter soon outnumbering the former despite continual immigration. Regional

identities, still strong in Spain, faded quite rapidly in the New World except for the Basques, few in number but influential in commerce, mining, and the royal bureaucracy. By 1600 Castilian had become the dominant language in the homeland and the official language of the empire.

Thus New Spain, that great Mexican portion of Spanish America, was much more than a superimposition of Spaniards upon a decapitated Aztec empire. It was a new creation resulting from the forceful application of a sharply honed and simplified imperial system to the programmatic reshaping of a highly developed civilization. As Octavio Paz has put it, the conquest of Mexico was "a historical act intended to create unity out of the cultural and political plurality of the pre-Cortesian world." The Spanish "postulated a single language, a single faith and a single lord" against that variety, and in less than a century had created a Spanish-speaking, Roman Catholic, civic-centered, land-based, multiracial, stratified society, organized within a rational hierarchy of territorial authority.

This territorial structure was a vast geopolitical system that recurrently showed great expansive power. Thus in 1600 a *New Mexico* was being created fifteen hundred miles north of the core of the first Mexico by a process still reflective of the reconquista. Juan de Oñate, from a family enriched by the mines of Zacatecas and Parral, had gained royal permission to subdue, at his own expense, the region of the agricultural Pueblo Indians whom Coronado had encountered sixty years before clustered along the upper Rio Grande and on several isolated mesas to the west, a population of perhaps well over 100,000 living in more than sixty towns. Oñate proceeded like many another predatory adventurer beyond the reach of official supervision, conquering, punishing, plundering whatever lay at hand, searching for mines and riches never to be found, settling in to exact tribute from a badly disrupted and sullen society. But as was also common to the process, such initial agents of conquest were soon overtaken by the formal institutions of the system and punished for their transgressions against the higher objectives of empire. Thus in 1606 Oñate was recalled, fined, and exiled from his new province; a new governor was soon sent to lay out a new capital town more closely following imperial instructions, missionaries moved in upon the largest of the nearby Indian pueblos, and the more orderly processes of incorporation of new lands and peoples into the larger imperial society was under way.

Jamestown, Quebec, and Santa Fe were founded within a year or two of one another, and are sometimes considered focal points for the earliest significant developments of regional societies in the United States and Canada. But these contemporaries were expressions of utterly different histories and phases of European expansion. For while the first two represent the precarious experimental struggle of the English and the French to get any substantial enterprise firmly attached to American shores, the new capital town near the southern end of the

Sangre de Cristo mountains was merely one more town added to the hundreds of such places already established by the Spanish in their century-old routine of conquering and planting in the Americas.

4. The Luso-African Contribution

Portugal's role in the history of America stems from an unintended imperial allocation and some early unexceptional commercial transactions, but it has been of enormous consequence. That their exploration of coastal Africa positioned the Portuguese to become the first Europeans in the trans-Atlantic slave trade is of course well known. What needs to be emphasized and clarified is that the Portuguese provided more than a mere seafaring link between Africa and America: they created the systems and societies that made possible and set the pattern for the creation of an Afro-American world. Before Columbus happened upon the American Indies a model for their colonization and exploitation was taking shape in the Luso-African tropics.

Shortly after Columbus's return from his first discoveries a formal division of imperial hemispheres was made by drawing a line through the vast emptiness of the mid-Atlantic, allocating to the Spanish whatever lands lay to the west, and reserving to the southward-probing Portuguese Africa and lands to the east. In 1494 this line was shifted somewhat farther to the west in recognition of Spanish retention of the Canaries, and only some years later did it become known that this diplomatic demarcation cut through a great eastward bulge of South America, giving the Portuguese claim to Brazil (a sequence which has made some historians wonder if the Portuguese knew more than they had revealed about the conformation of the South Atlantic). However, the foundations for a Portuguese America and for a wider impact upon the Americas had been laid in lesser lands some decades before.


Madeira, the Azores, and the Cape Verde Islands were all colonized in the fifteenth century. In the history of European discovery and exploration it is common to recognize these little Atlantic islands as stepping-stones across the ocean. But they were much more than stations on the route to the New World; they were themselves a New World and important proving grounds for new seafaring and planting systems, as Boxer notes:

The settlement of these uninhabited islands initiated the Portuguese into the practice of overseas colonization, and the settlers were literally pioneers in a New World. This was something of which they were naturally conscious, as shown by the fact that the first boy and girl born on Madeira were aptly christened Adam and Eve.

It was an opportunistic movement, initiated by individual seafarers, entrepreneurs, small companies, and groups of nobles, with varying royal support or eventual endorsement, and it drew upon many strands of that Iberian convergence—Portuguese, Castilian, Italian, Norman, Flemish. Sauer emphasizes the routine procedure of colonization in the Azores: "In the span of twenty years the archipelago in mid-ocean had become part of rural Portugal, a land of country gentry, farmers, and fishermen with a sizeable Flemish enclave." Domestication of this little scattering of islands took several decades, but it was initiated under the general overlordship of Prince Henry. Sauer's description seems an echo of Stanislawski's stress upon the importance that Portuguese kings had placed upon the orderly resettlement of lands recovered from the Muslims in previous centuries. On the other hand, Verlinden emphasizes Italian precedents, noting the prominence of Genoese merchants and the close resemblance of forms and procedures to those they had long applied in the Aegean and the Levant. Thus a new combination of these planting and seafaring traditions was brought to bear upon this new Atlantic World.

The Azores were halfway to the Grand Banks and the Portuguese were among the earliest to probe and limn the North American coast. In 1521, Fagundes, a mariner from Viana do Castelo in northernmost Portugal, got royal permission to establish a colony there as a more substantial base for fishermen, trade, and the manufacture of soap. Some evidence suggests that such a station was built on Cape Breton Island, but if so it did not last long and thereafter the Portuguese continued to be no more than a seasonal presence along with many others in the Great Fishery. It was in their southward rather than their westward voyaging that they would lay the basis for their crucial link with America.

The Cape Verde Islands, discovered in the 1450s, were also uninhabited but were considerably less attractive than Madeira and the Azores. Lying in the latitude of the southern Sahara two thousand miles from home this archipelago of semi-arid volcanic peaks provided a convenient base for explorers but rather meager possibilities for colonization. Pushing on to the south and east along the trend of the African coast the Portuguese seemed to have reached their original main objective of all this voyaging in 1471 when they came upon peoples amply supplied with gold ornaments, which they readily exchanged for iron, brass, and cloth. A decade of annual trading voyages (challenged on occasion by Castilian forays) proved profitable and the Portuguese decided to establish a permanent foothold on El Mina ("the mine," their term for this area, which soon became known as the Gold Coast). Thus in 1482 an expedition brought stonemasons and carpenters to build the fortress of São Jorge da Mina, as well as officials, priests, clerks, doctors, workers, and soldiers to staff and garrison it. Working through established networks of African traders they succeeded in diverting a profitable



4. The Luso-African System, c. 1500

portion of the gold mined in the interior highlands from long-established trans-Saharan traffic ways.

Gold was the great focus of Portuguese interest in Africa. It became basic to the homeland economy and central to royal support of overseas operations, as it was the incentive and means for continuing exploration and speculations. But all the while another African resource was emerging as profitable and apparently capable of extension to serve new and expanding markets. Portuguese seafarers first made connection with the African slave trade in the 1440s after reaching Cape Blanco. From a small station on Arguin Island in the lee of that bold promontory they

opened trade with Mauretanian merchants and soon attracted Muslim caravans. For a time they even had an inland post at Wadan on one of the main trans-Saharan routes. The several hundred slaves obtained annually by such means were readily disposed of in Lisbon, the Algarve, and Madeira. Slaves had long been a common part of the Mediterranean and Iberian scene. Some were worked in small gangs on galleys or on large estates, but mostly they were artisans or domestics of one sort or another, part of the service and adornment of a rich household, and integral if restricted members of the family and local community. In general, the system worked toward increasing acculturation and incorporation of such people through the generations, while being sustained by fresh additions from the sporadic trade in new captives taken from some distant military frontier, such as the Balkans (the word itself perhaps derived from "Slav," from peoples seized in the bitter fourteenth-century Turkish conquests of southeastern Europe). Similarly, slavery was an old institution in Africa. Throughout West Africa slaves were a part of most societies. They were "outsiders," people who had been captured in war or purchased or born in captivity lacking proper affiliations with clan or caste to give them a legal claim on ordinary freedoms. Most were employed in family households, and all had a recognized status as part of the community. In some of the larger African states royal slaves, like those in the Turkish empire, were persons of special talents and privileges; used in administration and as specialized military units, such groups were often quite powerful and not always under close control.

These ancient systems became transmuted by stages in the early decades of this new Atlantic World into what would become the distinctive American type of slavery. The general marks of that type were as follows:

1. the extensive use of mass labor in specialized agricultural or mineral production for export;
2. the exploitation of such laborers as a commodity to be used up and replaced by purchase;
3. an extensive system to supply large numbers for sale annually at a reasonable price;
4. the heavy male bias in such use and trade, inhibiting the comprehensive formation of families;
5. the formalized debasement in custom, and in part in law, of such people as unworthy of acculturation and incorporation into the general community; and
6. the linkage of status with color, by which Blacks but not Whites were subject to slavery.

The sugar boom in late fifteenth-century Madeira offers an early hint of this new type. The first mill was erected in 1452; within a few years shipments were being made to England and Flanders, improvements in refining soon made Madeira sugar a superior product, and for a brief while these intensively terraced little islands

became Europe's greatest source of an increasingly valued commodity. Sugar cane is a South Asian plant that the Arabs had brought to Egypt and Palestine, from where it was carried to various Mediterranean districts and to the Algarve and southern Morocco. The heavy hot labor of cultivation and harvesting had long been done in large degree by some sort of coerced labor; Galloway states that the sugar-slave link "became firmly forged in Crete, Cyprus, and Morocco" using war captives marketed by the Turks. The Madeira beginning coincided with the firm Portuguese connection with Muslim traders at Arguin, providing an ample supply of Black slaves from tropical Africa.

The Madeira industry soon reached its limits, and the Cape Verde Islands were too dry to provide more than a minor extension. The next major development was the discovery of another set of uninhabited islands lying off the great bend of the African coast in the Gulf of Guinea: São Tomé, tiny Príncipe, and mountainous Fernando Po (Bioko). Colonization of São Tomé began about 1485. The rich volcanic soils of its rainy lower terraces proved superb for sugar cane, and the "strange company of young Jews, exiles, officials, traders, and slaves" who pioneered here soon made it a major source of European supply. And here slavery began to take on a new scale and character. The Portuguese at São Jorge da Mina had been dealing in slaves, primarily buying from coastal traders to sell to other African merchants for use as porters in the expanding traffic to the interior mining region. Trade was now quickly broadened to include the Congo and later Angola, to supply the demand for thousands of laborers. The estimate of 50,000 slaves imported into São Tomé by 1550 indicates the intensity of the sugar boom, the high mortality of slavery's victims, and the rapid emergence of a mass procurement and marketing system.

São Tomé would remain the largest slave importer for several decades and would thereafter long serve as a major entrepôt for the assembling and seasoning of slaves for marketing to Brazil, but the transatlantic traffic in slaves was begun from other sources and the early destination was Spanish, not Portuguese, America. In Hispaniola as in the Canaries the Spanish first tried to make use of natives, but the devastations of disease and enslavement so quickly depleted this labor supply that other sources were sought. Ovando arrived with authorization to bring in *ladinos* (Iberian Christianized Negroes) to work in the mines and in 1510 shipments of *bozales* (Negroes not yet Christianized but untainted by Islam or Judaism) were allowed. By 1517 Genoese entrepreneurs and Canarian technicians had gotten sugar production underway and the first licenses were issued for direct importations from Africa. Thus, when Cortes left Cuba for Mexico in 1519 "the basic machinery for importing slaves to the Indies had been established." That "machinery" was entirely in Portuguese control, and the principal center for the development of the trade was in the Cape Verde Islands.

These islands, lying three hundred miles out from the westernmost headland of

Africa, had served well as a revictualing station, providing dried goat meat, grain, yams, fruit, and salt for Portuguese fleets working the Gulf of Guinea and, after da Gama's voyage, the Indian Ocean trade. Now they became pivotal in a new Portugal–Africa–West Indies traffic, and slave procurement was intensified on the adjacent mainland. Hence "Guine de Cabo Verde," the Portuguese term for the hinterland of the Senegal, Gambia, and Casamance rivers and the many estuaries on south to Sierra Leone, became the first major source of the African contribution to the repopulation of the American tropics and "the key region for cultural interchange between Africa and the West through a series of Afro-European communities in the coastal towns."

It proved impossible to establish any substantial European enclave on the coast of West Africa because endemic diseases, especially yellow fever and malaria, proved as deadly to Europeans as European measles, smallpox, and pneumonia were to American Indians. The mortality of European residents and visitors was often eighty percent or higher. Hence they tended to stay on ships, work through African traders, and tarry as briefly as possible. The semi-arid Cape Verde Islands were somewhat less dangerous, but, more important, because few Portuguese families could be lured to such distant and niggardly lands, there rapidly developed a mulatto population, an amalgam from the various Portuguese, Genoese, Castilian, and other European settlers and sojourners and from the Wolof, Sereer, Malinke, Joola, and other African captives and associates. Such offspring were generally immune to African diseases and could make familial or ethnic connection with mainland societies. Therefore, here on the Cape Verde Islands and adjacent Africa a racial and cultural fusion took place, resulting in the first Africanization of a European society. To European eyes the great majority of the Cape Verdeans were a "colored" people, mostly mulatto, with Black Africans, slave and free, a routine part of every community; yet the ruling polity, language, religion, dress, and social norms were dominantly Portuguese. Black clergy served as priests in the cathedral on Santiago and as missionaries on the African coast; Black merchants, industrialists, and craftsmen provided the goods for trade; Black deckhands and canoemen manned the distinctive vessels (a Portuguese and African blend) of local commerce; and, critical to the entire system, the *lançados*, a mulatto trading class—"speaking both creole and African tongues, professing Christianity and practicing paganism, tolerated by African societies but not part of them, imbued with certain European racial concepts, and wedded to the notion that they were 'Christian', 'Portuguese', and 'white'"—became the resident brokers in the coastal and river towns of Senegambia who worked with the indigenous Muslim *juula* trading caste to procure slaves from old and far-reaching networks. The trade itself came to depend a good deal upon a Cape Verde Island textile industry, which, through extensive use of both slave and free artisans, developed a

highly valued cloth from African cottons featuring blends of African, Moorish, and Portuguese designs. So, too, this region, islands and mainland together, became the first major area for the exchange of African, European, and American crops and the creation of new agricultural systems therefrom. African rice, yams, and millet were taken to America, and American maize and manioc entered into Senegambian agriculture. The provisioning of slave ships became an important part of the regional economy.

Here, therefore, in the Cape Verde Islands–Senegambia in the late fifteenth and early sixteenth century a region was formed that became literally fundamental to the creation of America and to its enormous and variegated Afro-American component.

In the 1530s that regional role began to be modified and shared as the transatlantic slave traffic began to swell and diversify into new markets. In 1531 the first direct shipment from São Tomé to Santo Domingo and San Juan was made. In this decade sugar production got underway in several other parts of Spanish America, including several mainland districts. But the conquest of Mexico lured the Spanish far more heavily into mining and ranching and governing than into plantation agriculture. Slaves continued to be imported annually through the Portuguese system but this interimperial traffic became far overshadowed by the belated rise of Portugal's own American colony to preeminence in world sugar production. Drawing upon Madeira and Cape Verdean sources, Genoese entrepreneurs implanted a sugar industry in Brazil and began to ship to European markets in the late 1530s. But there were many difficulties and success came only after the shift in policy from the early *donatario* system to more direct governmental initiative in the planting of a major Portuguese emigrant colony with authority to import African slaves. From the miscellaneous band of adventurers and exiles, a wealthy European and mulatto planter class rapidly emerged, to preside over households of Black and mulatto servants and large gangs of enslaved African fieldhands on rude estates hacked out of the forests of Bahia and Pernambuco. This process was in all essentials a demonstration of how during the half century preceding the small African equatorial island of São Tomé had been "a portent of the future, the pilot project for new world sugar plantations." In the last quarter of the sixteenth century Brazil suddenly became the largest slave-importing region in the world; it was the onset of an insatiable appetite: "For three centuries Brazil would consume more African slaves than would any other portion of the Atlantic world." The enduring legacy of this horrendous appetite was the creation of the largest and most densely Africanized region in mainland America and, more broadly, of one of the greatest, most complex, and vital mulatto societies of the world.

Thus Portugal developed the system that bound Europe, Africa, and America together. For well over a century the Atlantic slave trade was essentially a Por-

tuguese monopoly (recurrently challenged but never seriously depleted by interlopers and smugglers), a system continually adjusting to new supplies and demands, extending its impact ever more powerfully upon the human geography of the Atlantic World. The Atlantic islands and the Lisbon market had provided an impetus and the Cape Verde Islands–Senegambia procurement and marketing system was effectively in place by the time Columbus opened the way to the New World. The Spanish were able to connect readily with that system and extend it across the Atlantic to help lay the foundation of the first Euro-American empire and they continued to draw upon it year after year so that an African ingredient, while varying in strength and never dominant, became laced through the whole body of Spanish America. Meanwhile on little São Tomé the new Euro-African sugar production system was rapidly perfected to a form that would readily transfer to the grand stage of Brazil and thereby establish across the equatorial Atlantic the most powerful bonds between Africa and America.

By 1600, it is estimated, about 275,000 Africans had been sold into slavery within the European-dominated Atlantic world. Nearly 50,000 of these had gone to Europe itself, but that sizeable total becomes a trickle when spread over the century and a half of shipment, and some portion of these slaves were reexported. The Atlantic islands accounted for another 25,000, São Tomé over 75,000, reflecting the emergence of the firm sugar–Black slave link. Thus the American imports account for less than half of the total to that date, but America was clearly the great market of the future. In the last quarter of the sixteenth century more than eighty percent of this mounting outflow was directed to Spanish and Portuguese America.

Thus the system and pattern of the tragic African diaspora were also in place long before the northern Europeans got a firm hold upon any part of America, and African slaves and Brazilian sugar had joined Mexican and Peruvian gold and silver as powerful lures to avaricious and nationalistic seafaring predators. It was through their opportunistic forays into this tropical realm that small strands of this African-American connection would become attached to North American shores and introduce one of the most fateful additions to American diversity.

5. Initiatives in the North and Huguenot Enterprise

John Cabot's voyage from Bristol in 1497 and his discovery of a mainland directly across the western sea is a famous but increasingly controversial event. Dispute arises over the geographical question of exactly which coastland he sighted, and over the historical question of whether he was the first to have sailed that far and sighted that land. Inferential evidence suggests that Bristol mariners may already

have known of that North American shore and been harvesting its rich seas for a decade or more, a reading which led Sauer to assert that "the English were first to cross the western sea . . . by private initiative of seamen and merchants of Bristol, experienced in trade with Iceland, Madeira, and the Azores." But even if true this minority view does not seem to alter the common version of subsequent events. As Quinn states,

It did not greatly matter whether men from Bristol or men from Terceira [Azores] first saw land in the west, so long as they did not align their sovereigns behind them to obtain exclusive rights and thus manipulate discovery and control exploitation in these areas.

There were several attempts to follow up the first Cabot voyage with larger exploring and trading expeditions, but with little result, and thereafter there is little evidence of substantial English activity toward American shores for many years; at most some continued participation in the Great Fishery may be inferred. This brief flurry of initiative seems critically dependent upon the Bristol link with Azorean seafaring and Italian mariners, while the long lapse may suggest that in general the English were not yet ready in mind and institutions for a sudden extension into transoceanic enterprise. They were seeking a passage to Cathay, and the newfound land was itself an insufficient lure.

The French rather than the English were the most immediate and prominent successors of Cabot. Norman, Breton, Basque, and Rochellais mariners working the fisheries of the Grand Banks and Newfoundland and Labrador shores were the vanguard of wide-ranging French transatlantic initiatives. Verrazzano, Italian-born but long resident in France, sailed from Dieppe to conduct an extensive exploration of the North American coast in 1524 and then helped open trading with Brazil, where French vessels were soon more frequent than those of the Portuguese and where a number of ephemeral outposts were set up. In the 1530s Cartier, a St. Malo mariner who was probably well acquainted with the Brazilian as well as the Newfoundland coasts, made two voyages, investigated the St. Lawrence River as far as the Indian settlement of Hochelaga (Montreal), and spent a winter near Stadacona (Quebec). Both men became interested in the colonization of this part of America. Verrazzano (who was killed by Carib Indians in 1528) was reported to have returned from his first great voyage with strong ambitions "to people the regions he discovered with French colonists, to introduce European plants and domestic animals, and to bring the 'poor, rough and ignorant people' of North America to Christianity"—in short, to transplant European civilization onto American shores. Cartier's program on his return in 1541 was narrower in concept, for the main purpose of his colony on the St. Lawrence at Charlesbourg-Royal (near Quebec) was a base for further exploration for a Northwest Passage and

conquest of a rumored rich kingdom of Saguenay. He was able to obtain only a few colonists, mostly convicts, and after one season of Indian harassment, scurvy, and winter hardship he abandoned the place. A reinforcement party, led by Roberval, of two hundred settlers, including some women, arrived soon after and built a more substantial settlement, but after another winter of sickness and cold they too gave up and went home.

These were important experiences. France certainly had the requisite seafaring skills and was applying them to the search for wealth in an expanding oceanic world. The lure of plunder, whether of treasure-laden Spanish ships or mythical American kingdoms, was primary, but trade with the Indians for furs had been initiated even though it was not as yet of compelling interest, and the idea of colonization was becoming an integral part of French plans. These voyages, backed by the king, were well equipped; had the barrels of iron pyrites and quartz crystals that Cartier brought back from Canada turned out to be the gold and diamonds he thought they were, we may assume that the New France he proclaimed on these deep probes into northern America would have become substantiated by a major colony long before the days of Champlain.

By mid-century Protestantism was rapidly gaining strength in many parts of France, particularly among some sections of the nobility and the bourgeoisie. The severe religious and political tensions arising therefrom provided a new impetus and a new kind of colonist for American ventures. Gaspard de Coligny, Admiral of France, became strongly sympathetic to the Protestant cause and when the soldier of fortune Villegaignon proposed the idea of a Huguenot colony on the coast of Brazil, Coligny saw an opportunity to unite humanitarian and strategic objectives. Thus in 1555 an expedition sailing from the naval base at Le Havre established a settlement on an island in Rio de Janeiro harbor. In the following year nearly three hundred reinforcements were sent to this "Antarctique Gaul," including fourteen Genevans selected by John Calvin himself (Villegaignon and Calvin had been contemporaries at the University of Paris). More were preparing to go but the colony was soon in severe trouble. Villegaignon, sensing the tide of affairs in France, declared his Catholicism and came into bitter conflict with the Protestants. This dissension together with great practical difficulties in getting the settlement established led to a disintegration, the return of most, and the slaughter of the remnant by the Portuguese in 1560.

The Huguenots were strong, however, in the western and northern coastal regions, and the idea of Huguenot colonies in America was now very much alive. Attention was now turned to the northern margins of Iberian America, lured especially by the possibilities of preying upon the Spanish treasure fleet in its annual voyage through the Florida Strait. The Spanish had made several attempts to establish a permanent presence on the mainland coast of Atlantic Florida but

without success. In 1523 Ayllon, a wealthy entrepreneur from Hispaniola, brought a party of several hundred colonists, slaves, and missionaries to a site on the "Rio Gualdape" (presumably the Savannah River or vicinity). But Ayllon suddenly died and dissension and Indian pressures soon caused a withdrawal. In 1559 a new governor of "Florida and Santa Elena" undertook a major strategic program to establish a colony on the Gulf Coast of northern Florida as the base of an overland route across the peninsula to an outpost at Santa Elena, but this, too, was a failure. By the time the French arrived in force the Spanish had just made a careful coastal reconnaissance as far north as Chesapeake Bay but had failed to establish a permanent foothold.

In 1562 another group of largely Huguenot colonists—sponsored by Coligny and led by Jean Ribault, an experienced French buccaneer—sailed from Le Havre and set up a small base, Charlesfort, on Port Royal Sound. Ribault returned for reinforcements but found that religious warfare had broken out and Le Havre was under siege, so he fled to England. The small colony soon broke up from internal conflict. As soon as peace was restored in France another party under Laudonniere, who had been second in command under Ribault, was sent out in 1564 and established Fort Caroline on the St. John's River in Florida. But weak leadership, a neglect of subsistence in favor of a frantic search for gold, and troubles with the Indians put the colony in severe difficulty. A fleet carrying reinforcements led by Ribault arrived the next year but was almost immediately dispersed and damaged by a severe storm. The colony was then attacked and taken by the Spanish, and in a savage retribution for this intrusion all but a few of the captured French were executed. The French retaliated with various forays but the outbreak of much more extensive religious warfare within France, culminating in the Massacre of St. Bartholomew's Day in 1572 (in which Coligny was murdered), and the suppression of Protestantism brought a cessation of sponsored colonization projects.

These French thrusts prompted the Spanish to strengthen their hold upon the tropical borderlands. The destruction of Fort Caroline was part of a comprehensive geopolitical program entrusted to an Asturian naval commander, Pedro Menéndez de Avilés. Menéndez envisioned a strategy of development anchored on Havana, pivoted on Florida, and reaching from the Pánuco River on the northwest shore of the Gulf of Mexico far up the Atlantic coast to Chesapeake Bay. With a large force brought over directly from Spain he established St. Augustine as a major mainland base, and a number of smaller garrisons and missions, including forts on the sites of the two abortive French colonies. In 1570 a Jesuit mission was begun somewhere in the vicinity of the Powhatan Indians in the lower James River area, and in the next few years a considerable number of Asturian farmer-colonists were sent to Santa Elena. But by now a long history of brutality and treachery had made nearly all the Indian tribes of southeastern North America enemies of the Spanish. The

Chesapeake missionaries were soon murdered, the colonies were harassed and dwindled in strength and resolve, French privateers reappeared, and in 1586 St. Augustine itself was devastated in a raid by Sir Francis Drake. That was a powerful signal of the entry of a new contestant for American empire, and indeed, an English colony had already been initiated in the northern reaches of what the Spanish regarded as their Florida.

6. The Emergence of the English

The abrupt collapse of Huguenot initiatives toward America was followed by the emergence of the English as a major transatlantic force. Although the cessation of the one was not simply the cause of the other the sequence was significant, for the English learned directly, variously, and extensively from the French. Rowse noted: "It seems that the idea of American colonization came to us out of that Huguenot circle."

English seafaring only gradually realized the full oceanic possibilities of the new age, first in voyages of trade and privateering to Brazil and the West Indies, then by corporate mercantile ventures to Morocco, Guinea, and, by way of a new north-east sea route, Muscovy. Meanwhile Bristol and West Country fishermen rose to prominence in the Grand Bank and Labrador fisheries. As Morison notes, it was not until the 1550s and 1560s that "Englishmen were acquiring experience of deep water and long voyages which qualified them to contest empire with mighty Spain"; and in the 1580s in his argument for extensive American undertakings Hakluyt laid great stress on the much-needed benefits to English seafaring: "For it is the long voyages . . . that harden seamen and open unto them the secrets of navigation." In most of these activities French influence was apparent, arising in part from long-standing maritime connections across the Channel, in part from close links in political and intellectual circles, and perhaps most forcefully from direct involvement with the Huguenot cause. In 1546 sixty French mariners, pilots, and hydrographers, all Huguenot sympathizers, were in temporary service with the now Protestant English king. Ribault, the naval leader of French Florida, was one of them and when he again came to England in 1562 he soon organized a joint Anglo-French colonization scheme for that same coast. Queen Elizabeth gave Stukeley, the English coleader, a license to plant a colony there but no expedition was sent. John Hawkins had similar ideas and on his second slave-trading circuit to the West Indies visited Fort Caroline in 1565 just before its destruction by the Spanish; as mayor of Plymouth and a leading seafarer, Hawkins became heavily involved in assisting the Rochellais against the siege by French Catholic forces. Hawkins, Drake, Gilbert, and Raleigh are only the most famous among the leaders in Elizabethan oceanic and American ventures who were directly involved with the Huguenots. Richard Eden, the Cambridge geographer

whose translations from Spanish accounts presented "for the first time in English or in England a substantial body of information on the new age," entered Huguenot service in 1562 and may be presumed to have paved the way in England for the enormously influential work of the two Richard Hakluyts, and in France for the comprehensive foraging by the younger Hakluyt (during his five years as chaplain to the English ambassador in Paris) for all matters relating to voyages and colonizations. Among the most famous of this Hakluyt's finds and early publications were the official reports of French Florida, which presumably were of considerable practical value in giving good firsthand information about America and the opportunities and difficulties of planting there.

Howard Mumford Jones has called attention to the fact that the very words *colony* and *plantation* seem to appear in English only in the 1550s, suggesting that despite decades of activity by the Spanish, Portuguese, and French, "English thinking about the nature of a colony had to begin virtually *de novo*." It is also of interest to note that the first appearance of the former word is in one of Eden's translations of Spanish-American experience, and the first appearance of *plantation* is in a 1558 history of Ireland. And reference to Ireland in such a matter at just this time points to the interacting significance of Ireland and America in the Elizabethan and Stuart experience of conquering and planting.

"Ireland was on the way to America," averred A. L. Rowse, and he went on to emphasize that it was a West Country group with hard-won experience in Ireland that carried forth the first English colonizing efforts in America. The stress should be put on the connection, not the sequence, for to a large degree English efforts in Ireland and America were contemporary, and even where Ireland served as experience it offered no model of how to conquer and plant effectively.

At mid-century "the English Pale" seemed an accurate label to the English for their position in Ireland. Military conquest, treaties, garrisons, punishments had repeatedly failed to produce a secure English hold, and it remained a pale, "a country embanked against marauders." That was of course an imperial view: the "marauders" were the native Irish desperately trying to regain their own land. In 1556 after yet another Irish rebellion had been crushed, the idea of systematic plantation was put forth as a fresh and permanent solution. Irish land would be confiscated from hereditary local chieftans, vested in the Crown, shired (that is, divided into formal counties as juridical and administrative territories), and allocated to English proprietors who would survey and further partition their lands into leaseholds for new loyal British settlers. Applied to an area just west of the Pale, the program had no immediate success for few capable proprietors or settlers could be lured to such desolated and dangerous lands in the woods and bogs of Ireland. But it did serve to launch the idea of colonization. Subsequent Irish "plantations" were elaborations upon the same program and we may well assume that those in America were in some degree also.

The famous half brothers from Devon, Humphrey Gilbert and Walter Raleigh, together with their cousin Richard Grenville, provide the best illustration of the links between Ireland and America, and with France as well. Gilbert was captain of an English force sent to help the Huguenots in 1562. Returning, he was soon sent to fight in Ireland, and while there he wrote his *Discourse* on the need for a vigorous English outreach to the New World and through the Northwest Passage to the riches of Asia. In this treatise he argued the advantages of colonies as supports to trade and as an outlet for the unemployed. Meanwhile, Grenville was leading a group of Devonshire men in an attempt to set up estates in Munster, the southern quarter of Ireland. When the Munster Irish revolted, Gilbert led the force that defeated them and became a leader in formulating new English schemes for the permanent pacification of Munster and also Ulster, the rebellious northern region. Next he was sent by the queen to lead an English army assisting the Dutch in their revolt against Spain. Returning from there Gilbert considered a variety of ventures and then in 1578 obtained from Queen Elizabeth a charter to take possession of lands and found a colony anywhere on the coast of America between Labrador and Florida. His first fleet, hastily assembled that year, never got out of British waters, but in 1580 a reconnaissance was made and in 1583 Gilbert led an expedition from Plymouth. Landing in Newfoundland he asserted formal English possession of that long-used island fishing base and then sailed southward to seek a favorable site for a colony. But the season was late and a variety of troubles made him decide to return to England and come back the next year better prepared. Gilbert never got home, for he went down with one of his small ships in the stormy Atlantic, and Raleigh, who had also soldiered in France and Ireland, now took hold of the enterprise. He obtained a similar patent from the queen and sent out a reconnaissance party in 1584, which returned with glowing reports of the Carolina Banks area. In the next year Grenville led a party of over one hundred men to Roanoke Island and oversaw the founding of a settlement. This group gave up and came home the next year just before Grenville came again with more supplies. In 1587 Raleigh sent another, directing them to Chesapeake Bay as a more favorable region. However, the naval commander of the expedition (a Portuguese who had piloted Gilbert) was so eager to go on the hunt for Spanish treasure ships that he hastily dumped the settlers on the old site on Roanoke Island. This predilection for plunder dogged the enterprise. The ships sent out with supplies and reinforcements in 1588 were diverted by their captain to the taking of prizes and were thereby crippled and never crossed the ocean. Later that year the Armada appeared and the war with Spain delayed the sending of a supply vessel until 1590, when no trace of the inhabitants could be found: a mystery implanted in the American epic as "the Lost Colony." Having invested so much effort and money to so little avail in Virginia Raleigh and Grenville now turned again to Ireland where both had

obtained large estates in another and much larger plantation scheme initiated after the Munster Rebellion of 1585.

Thus the English were rapidly gathering experience, but they had much to learn. They became superb seafarers, but had so honed their skills in preying upon the Spanish that they found it difficult to apply them consistently to less daring and less profitable purposes. They enlarged their sphere of conquest in Ireland, but it was the continuation of an experience so harsh and frustrating that it engendered attitudes about "natives" that in turn gave rise to policies of ruthless expulsion or near extermination as the only hope for sustained control. They were developing ideas about the objectives and means of planting but their test in practice had as yet produced no satisfactory result. They dreamed of and inferred great wealth awaiting in America but had yet to produce any compelling evidence.

Gilbert's *Discourse* and the elder Hakluyt's careful instructions to Frobisher some years later on how to organize a colony show that they were thinking more of a trading post or an overseas base ancillary to trading or mining operations than of a permanent plantation. As one historian comments, Hakluyt had not yet grasped the first principle of colonization, "that colonies must first be able to feed themselves." In 1584 the younger Richard Hakluyt drew up a "Particular Discourse on the Western Planting" that was much the most comprehensive statement of the time and the best reflection of English perspectives over the next thirty years. Prepared at the behest of Raleigh for presentation directly to Queen Elizabeth, it was a rigorous argument in support of extensive American undertakings by a man whom we now regard as "one of the directing minds of the new age," who spoke "with the voice of the new nationalism." Hakluyt's views are important not only because of his influence but because of his unprecedented study of the whole question. He had schooled himself in everything available regarding the colonial experiences of the Portuguese, Spanish, and French. Resident in Paris part of each year, he drew extensively and explicitly upon the "late plaine examples of the Frenche" and served as a major link in the diffusion of ideas about colonization across the Channel. Hakluyt argued that English settlements in America would serve to "inlarge the glory of the gospell and . . . plante sincere religion" and also "staye the spanische kinge from flowing over all the face . . . of America," a land which England had every right to claim as her own. But the main purpose, it seems clear, was to tap and to create wealth by harvesting the natural products that abounded in America and by introducing into cultivation and preparation all those commodities now obtained in "our olde decayed and dangerous trades in all Europe, Africa, and Asia." A further natural result of this expanding enterprise would be the invigoration of English seafaring and of a host of related trades, as well as the export of English goods as the Indians were brought to a state of civility. If such arguments were not really new, the scale of the undertaking envisioned and

the concern for how it should be accomplished were. Although not specified in geographical detail, Hakluyt certainly hoped that England would quickly "plante upon the mouths of the greate navigable Rivers" all along the coast from Florida to Cape Breton Island.

Those plantations were to be from the outset naval bases strongly fortified against challenge from the sea, missionary and trading bases for the Indian nations upriver, and firmly rooted settlements drawing their basic sustenance from the land itself. It was this last feature, which we now accept as the obvious "first principle" of colonization, that represented the greatest advance. Hakluyt not only listed all the provisions needed for the proper support of a major expedition, but also the domestic animals and plants (wheat, rye, barley, oats, beans, peas, buckwheat) to sustain a permanent colony.


But who would be the colonists? Here again Hakluyt explored the question more thoroughly than had others. It is clear that mainly he regarded the poor and unemployed of England as the great potential source. It is in fact one of his strongest arguments in favor of colonization that it would provide a productive outlet for "multitudes of loyterers and idle vagabonds," for petty criminals "that for trifles may otherwise be devoured by the gallows," for the children of "wandering beggars," for great numbers who "dare not or cannot for their debtes shewe their faces," for "soldiers and servitors" idled by the cessation of war who might be sent to America "to the common profit and quiet of this Realme." The argument was certainly not new; Gilbert had used it in his *Discourse* eighteen years before, and concern for the individual miseries and the social dangers of high unemployment was chronic in Elizabethan England. But if there seemed therein an obvious human resource for American undertakings Hakluyt's extensive discourse on the topic falls short of declaring the absolute necessity for *family* colonization. That there were women as well as men who were vagabonds, beggars, criminals, and debtors may have been so apparent as to need no reference, but the need for stable families, and especially experienced rural families, to create a firm local foundation for any plantation appears not to have been so obvious. Most of the categories of colonists mentioned were in some way wards or potential wards of the state and thus, as Hakluyt suggested, "might be condemned for certen yeres in the western partes." Such people would be more appropriately thought of as sojourners than settlers, exiles hopefully earning their way back to civilized life in their homeland.

But if the idea of permanent emigration overseas was not yet central to concepts of English planting, it was nevertheless emergent. Gilbert regarded his whole enterprise as a social experiment and planned to offer free land to poor emigrant families. The first Raleigh expedition of 108 colonists contained no women, but the second included a number of extended families totaling eighty-nine men, seventeen women, and eleven children. Armed with elaborate plans for the "City

of Raleigh" they clearly intended to found "a genuine self-perpetuating colony, not a mere trading post or garrison."

The "late plaine examples of the Frenche" had suggested another category of colonists to Hakluyt and he did add to his argument that the English plantations would "provide a safe and sure place to receive people from all parts of the worlde that are forced to flee for the truthe of gods worde." But he seems to have regarded this as simply doing a good deed to help French and Flemish Protestants rather than seeing such religious refugees as an unusual and peculiarly valuable type of colonist. Gilbert had proposed to make use of English Roman Catholics as a nucleus for his colony, for such persons were now under severe public restriction in England. Whether many would have actually emigrated at this time (as they later did to Maryland) remains uncertain because the queen for various political reasons did not approve. But in 1593 England created a new set of religious refugees when Parliament decreed that English nonconforming Separatists must either stand trial for their lives or leave the country. Holland was the most obvious refuge, but one group petitioned the queen to be allowed to go to a "foreign and far country which lieth in the West from hence in the Province of Canada." Specifically, this group had made connection with English mariners who wanted to wrest control from Bretons and Basques of the rich walrus fishery around the Magdalen Islands in the Gulf of St. Lawrence. The English entrepreneurs, with the essential help of a Basque (and probably Huguenot) navigator, had already reconnoitered the area and in 1597 they sent a party including a clergyman and a farmer to inspect the feasibility of the island for a permanent Separatist colony. However, the resistance of the rival fishing fleets thwarted the enterprise, and these Separatists eventually joined the larger group of their exiled brethren in Holland.

In 1598 Parliament recognized banishment to lands beyond the seas as an acceptable punishment for rogues and beggars. In that same year a Breton arranged with the French government to ship some convicts to Sable Island, a low bleak sandy strip of land near the continental shelf a hundred miles off the coast of Cape Breton Island, to exploit the walrus and seals there and provide a base for wide-ranging operations in Acadia. Two years later a Norman rival set up a trading post at Tadoussac, the first wintering place on the St. Lawrence since that of Roberval in 1542. Such initiatives might well spur the English into further action for they were more than a fresh set of "plaine examples"—they were a French challenge to English claims over the fishery and northern coastlands. How to implant a permanent colony to substantiate such claims remained a problem for both the French and the English. As Morison has forcefully reminded us, "It is difficult for Americans, north or south, to accept the fact that for a century after Columbus's discovery, the ordinary sort of European had to be bribed, drugged, or beaten to go out to this 'land of promise,' unless to fish." But the idea of America as a religious refuge



was now alive in England. Such an emigration would also be impelled by threats and persecutions, but it offered a new conception of the "promise" latent in a new land.

Meanwhile, other English seafarers and entrepreneurs were probing for a Northwest Passage to Asia, an old geographic concept revived in part by the success of the English in opening a Northeastern trade route beyond Norway to Archangel. Martin Frobisher, backed chiefly from London, explored the Arctic seas along western Greenland and Baffin Island on three annual voyages in 1576-78. The last of these was a major expedition of fifteen vessels and more than a hundred workers to establish a mining camp on a small island at the entrance to Frobisher Bay to exploit the riches inferred from an ore sample brought back on the first voyage. But the loss of supplies en route defeated the plan for the colony, and the failure of persistent efforts to smelt any riches from the cargoes of rock bankrupted the enterprise. A decade later John Davis, with the support of various West Country investors (including Humphrey Gilbert's brother Adrian), made three voyages, probing much further north along the west of Greenland, but the war with Spain caused a long interruption before any more westward channels of the polar sea could be determined.

7. Implantations from Northwest Europe

Those tiny tentative French footholds of 1600 on the great fragmented rockbound promontory of nearest America were evidence of a growing realization of the possibilities for profits from the land as well as the sea, possibilities that owed as much to the spread of a fashionable craze for beaver hats in Europe as to the animal riches of northern America.

The Breton entrepreneur, La Roche, who came to Sable Island with the king's franchise for control of the whole region, had obtained a patent for some such colony as early as 1577 and in association with some French Basques had projected an outpost on the Gulf of St. Lawrence in 1583 (the same year a Rouen merchant was prospecting the Bay of Fundy with similar intent). The Sable Island colony of convicts ended in mutinous chaos in 1603; meanwhile rival promoters had connived to intrude upon La Roche's monopoly. The post at Tadoussac, set up by Chauvan, a Dieppe Huguenot who had obtained rights to the lower St. Lawrence, was a logical step following upon twenty years' growth in the seasonal trading for furs, chiefly by crews from St. Malo. This fine anchorage at the mouth of the Saguenay had become a great summer rendezvous for Montagnais and Algonkian Indians from a wide area.

There is direct continuity between these little enterprises initiated in the six-

teenth century by local Breton and Norman syndicates and the emergence of Acadia and Canada as substantial regional societies. And that continuity is primarily represented in the remarkable career of Samuel de Champlain, a Sain-tongese native who became associated with and was sent out to the Tadoussac venture in 1603. After returning to France he came back the next year with de Monts, the new head of the company who had been granted enlarged privileges by the king but also assigned the responsibility of planting sixty colonists a year to create a substantial New France. De Monts decided to go back to the system of summer trading from shipboard on the St. Lawrence, and shift to the ice-free Bay of Fundy as a more suitable area for a colony as well as a forward position against English encroachment northward upon his territories. A post was built at the mouth of the St. Croix, but after one harsh winter it was shifted across the Bay of Fundy to the sheltered basin behind Digby Gut. Here at Port Royal a substantial beginning was made, but in 1607 the company's commercial monopoly was revoked and it was decided that the prospects did not warrant continuance. However, after a two-year interval, Poutrincourt, who had been a resident lieutenant of de Monts, obtained a bit of financing to reopen a small operation at Port Royal. Meanwhile, de Monts obtained a brief reprieve and in 1608 sent Champlain back to the St. Lawrence to gain a larger measure of the profitable fur trade. Champlain now established a post at Quebec, a bold defensible site at the narrowing of the great river.

For more than twenty years the Port Royal and Quebec establishments were no more than little seafaring outposts by which a French presence was asserted over two closely related sectors of North America. In the 1620s the Crown and the Church drew up new programs for development (with Huguenots now officially excluded), but only in the next decade did colonization actually get underway. Despite that long interval, it was Champlain, now as royal governor, who oversaw the emergence of a substantial New France from these precarious nuclei.

The French concern over English intrusion was justified: "While the crews were loading the ships for departure [from Port Royal] in August, 1607, far to the south 105 Englishmen were establishing a base at Jamestown. Another group was making a similar attempt to the north on the Kennebec River, well within the confines of the territory ceded to de Monts." These landings at two widely separated locations were the result of an English colonization program of impressive sponsorship and substance, a quick culmination of a marked reassertion of transatlantic activities that included increasing aggressiveness in the fishery, several testings of resources along the many estuaries and islands of the northern coast, and renewed concern for the Chesapeake and the fate of Raleigh's Roanoke. In 1606 many of the varied interests behind these ventures were brought together in the charter for the Virginia Company, in which that name was now broadened to embrace a continental

segment stretching from the St. Croix to Cape Fear, divided into a northern sector allocated to a Plymouth-based association of West Country interests and a southern sector dominated by Londoners.

The Plymouth Company was quick off the mark, sending out two vessels later that year, but only one actually got to the designated locale, and not until 1607 was the colony initiated at Sagadahoc on the Kennebec River. However, despite a good beginning the death of two major backers and a hard winter caused a withdrawal of the settlement the next year and a shift to summer trading by ships. English activity continued over a broad reach of northeastern coastlines. What would prove to be a more enduring hold was implanted two years later on the Avalon Peninsula by a quite separate Bristol company, to be followed in a few years by two more nearby colonies, backed by other companies, on this southwestern corner of Newfoundland. Although small and unstable affairs, these were genuine colonies of men and women, aimed at providing year-round bases to enhance competitive positions in the fishery as well as to develop fur, timber, and mineral resources, and, so it was stated in the proposal of 1610, to serve as a halfway station between England and Virginia. And in these same years English interests became focused more fully on the lands lying toward the tropics from this promontory as they largely gave up hope of a Northwest Passage after the voyages of Hudson (1610) and Burton (1612) had limned the general shape of Hudson Bay.

In 1614 John Smith turned from the controversies of management at Jamestown to survey a portion of the northern coast for another entrepreneur, and after a brief look he named and extolled it in book and map as "New England," a term which the Plymouth Company soon incorporated into its renewed charter. There was sustained interest in the area by various investors and mariners but the fateful beginning was an accidental intrusion. Many of the English Separatists exiled in Holland became increasingly dissatisfied with their lot and prospects. The general attention being given to America in both Holland and England brought a reassertion, twenty years after the meager and aborted Magdalen Island scheme, of their consideration of America as a better prospect for social survival. Contact with a member of the London Company led to an invitation to emigrate to some district in its sector of Virginia. Apparently such was the intent, but blown off course by winter storms they made their landfall at Cape Cod in December of 1620 and decided to search for a suitable location in that vicinity. Subsequent negotiations with the Plymouth Company confirmed their rights to a large district opposite the Cape Cod Peninsula. As the Indians of that area had been nearly exterminated by diseases a few years before, no conquering was needed, and as these "Pilgrims" came as an autonomous settler group, rather than as wealth-seeking agents of a company, planting was the primary task. The creation of Plymouth colony proceeded without grave institutional impediments.

While this nucleus of Separatists slowly took root on Plymouth Bay a number of commercial posts were founded by various entrepreneurs at other harbors nearby. It was through connection with one of these, the outpost of the small Dorchester Company, originally located at Cape Ann (1623) but later shifted to Naumkeag, that a group of prominent Puritan leaders turned to Massachusetts Bay as the site for an American colony. The arrival of the first party of this far larger and more powerful body of religious dissidents at Naumkeag (Salem) in 1628 would soon become the boldest mark of a new phase in the outreach of European civilization to North American shores.

Meanwhile, a far more substantial English foothold had been implanted at great expense of men and resources in the southern sector of Virginia. This enterprise was a knowing successor to the Roanoke failure and aimed for the capacious embayment to which Raleigh's second expedition had been sent but never reached. The initial party of 1607 entered Chesapeake Bay, sailed up the southernmost of its many large estuaries, and after extensive reconnaissance, having in mind the elaborate instructions that the council had provided for the selection of "the strongest, most wholesome and fertile place," chose a swampy but defensible and deep-water site forty miles up the "Powhatan" (James) River along the north shore some distance from any Indian village. Here they constructed their fort, laid out their settlement, and began their increasingly chaotic and frantic search for riches. Jamestown was intended to be a permanent base but not necessarily the nucleus of a large colony of English settlers. The whole venture was a speculative commercial undertaking: there were no women in these first vessels and the men were all company employees, whose main task was to develop a profitable enterprise, not to initiate a new society overseas. The hardships, near failures, but ultimate success of this Virginia colony are so well known as to need no description. One clear implication of those early years of desperate struggle is that the English were still inexperienced at planting. The fundamental necessity of recruiting a solid nucleus of farmers and artisans and establishing first of all a local base for subsistence was understood by some individuals but ignored by the company, which insisted upon the earliest possible return on the investment.

The shift from company control to royal province in 1624 brought traditional institutions to bear upon problems of polity and society but there was little to bring from that tradition to aid in effective colonization, despite the long English experience in Ireland and some close relationships between Irish and American operations. The last years of Elizabeth's reign had seen the greatest of the Irish uprisings, harsh reconquests, and new programs for colonization. Much the largest and most drastic of these imperial schemes was applied to Ulster in 1606, in the same year and drawing upon some of the same investors and talent as were involved in the Virginia Company. A comprehensive plan for the redevelopment of six counties

in the north was defined and within a few years a dozen companies and many individual proprietors were at work luring English and Scottish Protestants to form a new geography of towns and estates.

The simultaneity of the Ulster experiment precluded it from serving as a model for Virginia, and although the dozen years (1585-98) of the second (and again, abortive) Munster Plantation were surely an important experience for both, the Irish and American contexts were significantly different. Thus while Quinn emphasized the "web of interconnection between Munster and America," he also carefully noted that in the former the English worked through long-established Irish ports and commercial networks, under an existing Dublin-based administrative framework, amidst a labyrinth of Munster land claims, and in considerable degree directly with local Irish and Old English tenants as well as with newly transported colonists. Such features limited the pertinence of Irish precedents. If Ireland was "the blueprint for America," as Rowse broadly put it, it was a dim print difficult to read and one that would need so much altering as building proceeded that the resulting structures would bear little resemblance. Thus whereas the Ulster project has been cited as "the first reasonably successful attempt at regional planning in Ireland," by which this northern area was "changed from being the last stronghold of pastoral, non-urban Gaelic traditions to become the powerful bastion of peoples whose speech, habits, traditions, unwavering loyalties and resolute Protestantism differed totally from native ways, and whose new towns and villages, commercial and industrial enterprise, and land-use methods were to transform the landscape," the Virginia plantation was at the outset almost formless and opportunistic, although it had an impact as dramatic and far-reaching.

But if successful planting was too new an experience in Ireland to shape American ventures, the long history of successive conquerings could hardly fail to have some influence. Although the Jamestown settlers were under instructions to avoid overt intrusion upon Indian grounds, they were quickly embroiled in a maze of disputes and ill feelings and in general they treated the Indians as Englishmen had come in general to treat the Irish: as a wild, savage, barbarian, unprincipled race that would have to be subdued by force, broken as a society, and, if still rebellious, cleared from the land. The concerted Indian attack upon the Virginia settlement in 1622 in which about 350 colonists were killed was a response to such treatment, and the ruthless retaliation that followed was but an American version of an old English practice in Ireland, the essential imperial prelude to whatever "regional planning" might then be applied.

Despite heavy losses of life, year after year the Virginia Company continued to send over people by the hundreds; women and children first arrived with the reinforcements of 1609. The company also began to modify its land policies so as to allocate free land to every head of household, and as tobacco began to emerge as a

profitable staple Virginia was soon transformed from a speculative mercantile project into a permanent implantation of Englishmen, attractive alike to capitalists and colonists. In 1612 Bermuda was settled by a subsidiary company as a useful outlier in the western Atlantic, following lengthy experience with this uninhabited island by the survivors of a Jamestown-bound vessel wrecked upon its shores in 1609.

In England at this time Guiana and southern Virginia were considered to be comparable realms, each a place of probable wealth in tropical products and gold and each prudently marginal to the main Spanish holdings. Thus they became competitive for the energies and resources of speculators and adventurers. Raleigh was the obvious embodiment of this connection, turning after his early Virginia disappointments to become obsessed with "the large, rich, and beautiful Empire of Guiana," whose coast he explored on several voyages. He was grossly deluded about its ready wealth, but several entrepreneurs attempted to establish colonies, one in 1604 along the "Wiapoco" (Oyapok) River, whose failure was followed by a larger French attempt in 1607, and that by another English venture in 1609, which lasted about four years. Soon after, the English set up posts at several points along the Amazon only to be expelled by the Portuguese. All of these were intended to be trading posts, plantations for the raising of tobacco and other crops, and bases for the search for gold and silver. By the 1620s these failures and the growing success of Virginia made it difficult to raise funds for further ventures in Guiana and the English turned away from the South American mainland to the nearby islands.

The wars with Spain had brought a much more aggressive and extensive assault upon Spanish shipping and installations in the West Indies, and the evident weakening of Spanish defenses led to ideas about the seizure of more permanent operational bases. In 1598 the English took San Juan, Puerto Rico, and were thwarted in their plans to make it such a base more by yellow fever than by the Spanish. In that same year Hakluyt had called attention to the fact, well known to those experienced in the area, that the "great multitude of . . . small isles called Las Antillas . . . are either utterly desolate, or inhabited by a few Salvages." Such was the condition of many of these islands after a century of ruthless raiding by the Spanish to provide labor for their plantations on the larger islands. Buccaneers of various nationalities had long used many of their anchorages. Abortive colonizations had been undertaken by the English in 1604 (St. Lucia) and 1609 (Grenada); the first sustained venture was headed by an English entrepreneur who had been at one of the Amazon posts and who then spent some months on St. Christopher (St. Kitts) making friends with the Indians and testing the ground for tobacco. He returned with a small group of colonists in 1624 and soon thereafter came to terms with a French party to share the island and thereby strengthen defense against any Spanish retaliation. These small beginnings were quickly followed by larger ven-

tures from each country. Barbados, uninhabited and somewhat detached from the main string, was colonized in 1627 and became the main English holding, under patent to the "Lord Proprietor of the Caribbees"; the *Compagnie des Iles d'Amérique* undertook French development of Guadeloupe and Martinique. Tobacco and tropical woods were the first main exports.

By this time the English and French had been joined by a new and ominously vigorous rival on the high seas. The Dutch, long established in the North Sea and Baltic trade, suddenly reached out across the oceans following their successful revolt from Spanish Hapsburg rule in the 1580s. The Spanish had reconquered Flanders and Brabant but were halted at the great waterways where, with English help, the Netherlanders held on to Zeeland, the islands commanding the greatest river entrance into the body of Europe. Antwerp, long the great fulcrum of northwest European finance and commerce, was recaptured by the Spanish, and as a result thousands of Flemish and Walloons, and especially those of Protestant sympathies, including a large proportion of the mercantile and artisan communities, fled into northern Netherlands. Thus Amsterdam soon doubled in population and became the center for a surge of fresh undertakings. Antwerp had long had close commercial and financial connections with both Portuguese and Spanish imperial operations. As the Portuguese were now chafing under Spanish royal dominance, mariners and merchants from Dutch ports were often welcomed at Portuguese overseas ports. Thus in the 1590s Dutch vessels began trading to Africa, Brazil, and the Orient; in 1602 the Dutch East India Company was formed with state assistance and by 1609 not only was it competing actively along the main eastern routes but it had engaged the experienced English seafarer, Henry Hudson, to search for a westward passage through America. He found instead two great rivers whose estuaries had lain obscured and unexplored behind the broad sandy shields of coastal New Jersey and Long Island. The northern one reached 150 miles into the continent; though not the Northwest Passage it was clearly a strategic portal and, by his account, led through very attractive country. Thus began Dutch interest in, and soon assertion of claim to, all the land between New England and Virginia, tributary to the Hudson and the Delaware (the North River and the South River, in Dutch usage). Fur trading posts were set up near the head of navigation on each of these rivers and later on the Connecticut.

In 1621 the Dutch West India Company was formed as a new instrument specifically to gain dominance over the Atlantic trade. Such an objective meant a primary focus on capture of the Spanish treasure fleets and domination of the sugar and slave trade, but the company's directors were familiar with the fervor in England for planting and gave attention to colonization projects as well. The Hudson Valley and Guiana were the chief areas of interest. An earlier scheme to make use of English Separatists (the Pilgrims) as the nucleus for a colony on the

Hudson had been refused by the Dutch government, so the new company turned to Flemish and Walloon Protestants who had already indicated their willingness to go to America by their petition to the London Company of Virginia a few years before. That petition had not been refused but neither had it been supported by the special aid that had been sought and thus no emigration had taken place. Thus these religious refugees now formed the main body of the first Dutch colonies in North America.

In what would become a famous exchange, the Dutch purchased Manhattan Island from local Indians and soon laid out New Amsterdam on its southern tip. The Dutch planting in the Hudson was immediately successful, in part surely because the company leaders were alert to learn from the experiences of their neighbors. The detailed instructions on "conditions for colonies" drawn up to guide proprietors emphasized all the essentials for firm beginnings, detailing the appropriate equipment and supplies and the necessity of giving priority to subsistence production. It was a planting which grew slowly, however, because the company was far more interested in more profitable ventures.

Dutch plantations were begun on the "Wild Coast" (Guiana) at this same time and grand designs upon the Spanish and Portuguese imperial systems were drawn up, but the chief focus was upon Spanish and Portuguese commerce. As early as 1598 Dutch seafarers had intruded upon the Guinea Coast and in the next year they sacked São Tomé. In 1617 they seized the little island of Goree lying in the shelter of Cape Verde and began to move boldly in upon the Senegambian slave trade and upon its main markets. In 1630 the Dutch seized Pernambuco and rapidly expanded their hold upon this northeastern coast. In the creation of this "Netherlands Brazil" the Dutch did not oust the Portuguese planters nor implant many new colonists but concentrated on controlling the profitable sugar trade. Meanwhile bold plunderings of the Spanish culminated in the Dutch capture of the main treasure flotilla off Cuba in 1628.

By 1630 seafaring, conquering, and planting, even though highly varied in application and uneven in results, had become recognizable components of American enterprise for all major Atlantic societies of Europe. The entire Atlantic front and marginal embayments of North America had been mapped and to some degree evaluated.

That continental coastline presented two markedly different faces to those approaching across the Atlantic, with some contrasting attractions for seafarers and planters. North from Cape Cod to Hudson Strait the uplands and ancient shield so recently scoured by continental ice were studded with harbors but nearly devoid of arable lands behind. The dense forests and summer meadows deluded many a viewer as to the prospects for settlements, even though most of the early entrepreneurs were envisioning no more than modest coastal footholds. Only the

glacial outwash lowlands of Massachusetts Bay and the narrow limestone margins of the St. Lawrence trench offered possibilities for extensive and continuous settlement. Furthermore, the winters were shockingly harsh to sojourners and settlers from similar latitudes in Atlantic Europe.

South from Cape Cod the most common features of the American shore were the long smooth margins of the coastal plain guarded by dangerous surfs, offshore bars, and shallow lagoons backed by monotonous stretches of pine barrens or swampland, inhospitable to seafarers and planters alike. The early challenge to seafarers was to find the great natural punctuations through this sandy barrier. By 1630 they had sounded all the main bays and estuaries and sailed up the tide-mingled flood of the great American rivers as far as their ocean vessels could carry them. These rivers varied greatly as entryways. The Hudson and St. Lawrence provided deep corridors into the continent, but the Connecticut, Delaware, Susquehanna, Potomac, and James offered much shorter penetrations, while the rivers of Carolina and Florida provided little more than estuaries for anchorage. Conquest and planting would be shaped by what lay beyond these many portals, by what kinds of men and institutions an outreaching society could bring to bear upon the peoples and the resources latent in the great variety of hinterlands.


The concept of planting overseas had developed slowly in northwest Europe. Plundering and trading were compelling attractions to these seafaring nations but the idea of transferring Europeans permanently onto American shores was far from obvious as to purpose or possibility. The Huguenots were in the vanguard and though their colonies were pitiful failures their composition and intent were strong hints of a new pattern. Sixty years later when Richard Eburne wrote in *A Plain Pathway to Plantations* that "it be the people that makes the land English, not the land the people," there was a New England to exhibit the argument, and a New Netherland and a New France already on the maps and soon to give similar substance to the proposition that societies of Europeans could indeed be established in lands an ocean away from home. That was of course a proposition which Ovando had begun to demonstrate well over a century before in a New Hispania, and by 1630 Ovando's implantation in those islands was a mere threshold of a Spanish empire that reached deep into the continent to a New Mexico thirteen hundred miles north of its old Mexican core.

8. Generalizations: European Source Regions

Geographically the topic of American beginnings leads to a focus upon southwestern Iberia. Seville and Lisbon were the first great seats of American enterprise, the pivotal points linking American operations to all the wider European world. Although both centers prospered as a result of America, both were as much

involved in the cause as in the effect. Each had grown from rich surroundings, the plains of Andalusia and Estremadura, which had been brought to a state of intensive cultivation and high productivity under the Muslims, before being conquered by Christian kingdoms from the north.

Of greatest significance for the outreach to America was the encounter, interaction, and intricate convergence in these two areas—and only in these areas in anything like this magnitude—of two great cultural traditions: imperial conquest and commercial seafaring. The former was brought to these lowlands by the Castilians and the Portuguese from their long continuous history of recovery of lands from the Muslims; the latter was brought by the Genoese, Venetians, Catalans, Jews, and others from the ancient cosmopolitan centers of the Mediterranean. It is not that seafaring and conquering had never been combined before; the Crusades are but one example among many from the history of the Mediterranean littoral to suggest otherwise. But never had such a highly developed set of institutions for the seizure, administration, and resettlement of new territories and their populace, an entire system of conquest, become so fully articulated with such a highly developed set of institutions for the financing, production, shipment, and marketing of goods. Furthermore, these traditions were compatible in numerous ways, reinforcing one another with different techniques and experience applicable to the same purpose. Both were fundamentally aggressive and predatory. Plunder and conquest were as much a part of the intensely competitive commercial world of



The Iberian Culture Hearth.

the Mediterranean as of the landed world of Iberia, as demonstrated by the Catalans in the Balearics, the Genoese in Corsica, and the Venetians in Crete. And both traditions included experience with planting as well as conquest. Mediterranean companies had often undertaken the development of new resources, reclamation of wastelands, and repopulation of devastated districts.

The long process of the *reconquista* was at once spasmodic and continuous, reflecting a remarkable combination of formality and freedom, of state planning and local opportunism. In the larger view it was a sequence of major campaigns and formal treaties, followed by periods of consolidation of newly acquired territories; but in the marchlands there was almost continuous guerrilla activity, fostered by a class of rough settler-soldiers, or, more accurately, rancher-raiders, who in return for braving the dangers of such border zones were left "to do very much as they liked, and what they liked was plundering Muslim villages." Thus the cutting edge of empire was kept finely honed for the next major advance.

Out of long experience Castille, especially, had developed an elaborate and efficient system for dealing with conquered territories and captive peoples. Booty was distributed and lands reallocated by royal commissions in amounts graded by rank, service, and official favor. Mosques were transformed into churches and militant religious orders empowered to supervise baptisms and conformity of the Moriscos. Civic institutions were implanted, new towns founded and often granted greater freedoms than those in older regions, and a new set of names imposed upon major features of town and countryside. When Seville was taken after a two-year siege the Castilian leader insisted on the expulsion of all its Muslims, an unusually severe tactic designed to secure so great a city. As thousands fled to Granada and Africa, thousands of Castilians and others poured in from the Christian highlands, and hundreds of merchants and shippers came in from the Mediterranean to join the small colonies of such people already there. Such periods of massive change, involving the relocation of populations, restructuring of society, redistribution of wealth, and widespread acculturation, are times of stress and opportunity, calling forth new leadership and stimulating new ventures.


The process of convergence of this imperial system with a seafaring tradition and its orientation to an enlarging Atlantic World takes many forms and passes through distinct phases. An obvious example would be the movement of a number of Genoese merchants and financiers to Lisbon and Seville, their rapid rise to wealth and prestige from new enterprises, their gradual intermarriage with leading Portuguese and Castilian families, and their ultimate transition into the local aristocracies. Geographically, we can follow the shift of Mediterranean seafarers to Atlantic bases, first to the main ports of San Lucar, Seville, and Lisbon, gradually spreading to the many lesser harbors as Atlantic commerce expands until, in the close concatenation of local maritime districts from Cádiz to San Lucar, the Rio Tinto, the Algarve, and north to Lisbon, mariners of many different Mediterra-

nean backgrounds are so intermingled with those native to these coasts—and also with those Minhotos, Galicians, and Basques who were also attracted to these fresh possibilities—as to enlarge and invigorate Iberian maritime culture. And it may properly be called Iberian, for, typical of maritime societies (and as this very process of migration suggests), such persons tended to be highly opportunistic, available for hire, ready to serve without rigid regard for national or dynastic political differentiations. Only after 1493 does the separation between Spanish and Portuguese seafaring enterprise become quite distinct.

And we can trace the development of new tools, especially of a new kind of ship with a stability, range, and capacity for truly oceanic service. Regular seasonal shipping from major Italian ports to Flanders did not begin until well into the fourteenth century. Such voyages revealed the need for new types of vessels and it was in pivotal Iberia that designers first “married Atlantic and Mediterranean technology” and began to evolve hulls intermediate “between the long and unstable Mediterranean war galley . . . and the ponderous merchant ships of northern Europe.” Outfitted with larger sails, lateen rigs, and a strong sternpost rudder, these new caravels “became available to the Portuguese shortly after the conquest of Ceuta,” and they are only the most obvious among the many inventions and adaptations that provided the basis for an oceanic imperialism.

While Columbus, a Genoese mariner sailing under a Castilian banner, was an appropriate symbolic vanguard of this new synthesis of Mediterranean and Iberian systems, John Cabot, the Venetian citizen sailing under an English banner five years later, did not prove to be the immediate forerunner of a comparable thrust across the Atlantic. When it did come, a century later, it too was a distinctive type that drew upon intensive experience and emanated from a highly creative sector of Europe.

We can see that region take shape in the turbulence of the sixteenth century as the pressures of the Reformation progressively narrowed and compressed the area of free-ranging Atlantic outreach. Seafarers from half a dozen maritime districts, from the Biscayan ports to the Bristol Channel, probed and gleaned the North American coast during the early years of the century. The Basques were leaders in fishing and whaling operations and Basque seamen were important in the service of many French expeditions. The prominence of La Rochelle in early colonizations may suggest an analogy with Iberia. In the wake of devastation and depopulation brought about by punitive crusades and plagues, large areas of southwestern France were recolonized in the thirteenth century through a network of *bastides*, new towns formed as centers for the development of the countryside into a great wine-exporting region. Such towns were new in kind as well, offering greater economic freedom and social equality as inducements to colonists. The resulting land promotion and resettlement, social experimentation and change, commercial speculation and vigorous marketing outreach led Vance to speak of Aquitaine as the



7. The Northwest European Culture Hearth.

laboratory for the later American operation. However, such a connection was made rather tenuous by the centuries intervening, although the Rochellais Huguenot mercantile culture was rooted in it. Huguenot colonization in the sixteenth century suffered from having no ready staple at hand and thus attempted to combine planting with privateering. The Huguenots were also soon crippled by religious persecution, so that the tragedy of the Albigenses themselves rather than the colonization of Albigensian lands came to be the more telling historical precedent. The Huguenots would eventually become an important ingredient in North American settlement, but chiefly as foreign refugees moving through English and Dutch channels.

The English were long deeply involved in southwestern France. Bristol had close ties with Bordeaux in the wine trade and Plymouth had particularly strong links with La Rochelle. Further north the bonds were more intimate. Amongst the many ports of Brittany and Normandy on the south, Cornwall and Devon on the

north, and the Channel Islands in between there had developed out of a long complicated heritage of local commerce and smuggling, dynastic ties, political intrigue, military forays, and refugee movements "something like an Anglo-French Channel community." A series of transatlantic ventures was launched by local syndicates of merchants from such places as St. Malo and Rouen and from various West Country English ports. Yet none of these secured a firm foothold and in both nations there came a shift eastward to more substantial resources and power. The suppression of the Huguenots brought closer involvement of the state and subsequent schemes would more commonly emanate from Paris by way of its outpost at Le Havre, although a good share of the commercial aspects of New France would remain in the hands of Rouen, La Rochelle, and Bordeaux merchants. On the English side, after Raleigh's failures it became increasingly evident that if they were to pursue anything like Hakluyt's program for development in "those large and spacious countries on ye easte part of America" there was a need for larger resources in the form of capital and skills and more direct support from within and around the royal court. Hence the inexorable shift toward London (a shift nicely symbolized by the benefices bestowed by the queen upon the Reverend Richard Hakluyt, who was made a canon of Bristol Cathedral in the 1580s and a canon of Westminster Abbey in 1600). In this way West Country enterprise was brought into closer connection with another rich mercantile tradition. London had long been a major foreign port of the great Hanseatic network of the North Sea-Baltic basins and had more recently been reaching out on its own to new lands: while Bristol and Plymouth were sending expeditions in search of a Northwest Passage to Asia, London had found a Northeast Passage to Muscovy. And just as it was becoming clear that American and Irish enterprise required a larger scale of operations, London commercial and financial resources and skills were being enriched by the influx from Antwerp and Huguenot France.

The Reformation reordered the human geography of northwest Europe. The English break with the papacy, the Calvinist revolt of the Netherlands, the suppression of French Protestantism, the return of Flanders to the Catholic fold, and the recapture of Antwerp by Spanish forces not only profoundly affected societies and politics but shifted the fulcrum of the European economic system, redefined the realms of relatively unrestricted commerce, and focused and fueled national rivalries. The estuaries and narrow seas connecting the Thames and the Zuider Zee emerged as the axis of a region of powerful forces, and London and Amsterdam came to dominate the next century of oceanic enterprise as Lisbon and Seville had the previous one.

On the eve of these disruptions Antwerp was the greatest commercial and financial center of the continent. Situated just off the great Rhenish waterway adjacent to the flourishing Flemish industrial district and at the convergence of

traffic from north, east, south, and west, its large cosmopolitan merchant establishment, subdivided by family, national, and commodity networks, handled the myriad products of all the lands and seas of Europe as well as those of the new oceanic commerce: Asian spices, African gold, Atlantic sugar, and American silver. But twenty years of war, siege, and deprivation following upon the initial revolt of 1566 destroyed this preeminence, halved the population, depleted its resources, and reduced Antwerp to a regional trade center with special linkages across the new international Protestant-Catholic border. As Antwerp had succeeded Bruges, now it yielded to Amsterdam. That capital of Holland, central within the free provinces of the Netherlands and secure behind a labyrinth of waterways and polders, was suddenly swollen with talented, wealthy, and well-connected refugees, as well as thousands of common laborers. Opportunities for investment abounded: in the needs of the city itself, in the expansion of the polders and intensification of local agriculture, fishing, and industries; in the realignment of European trade and the capture and extension of overseas networks; in the invention of new commercial facilities, such as the formation of a central bank with unprecedented resources and powers. By 1625 Amsterdam had doubled in population (to 100,000) and become "a capitalist centre on a new scale."

All the while, England, too, was undergoing fundamental changes. The break with the papacy was followed by increasing social upheaval and the subsequent warring with Catholic Spain called forth an unprecedented national fervor. It was a period of shifts in power and wealth, a time of population movement, of rural migration to urban centers, of foreign immigration to London and cities of the south and east. England drove out some of her own dissidents but received a far larger number of Huguenot, Flemish, Walloon, and other Protestants. Such persons constituted an uncommonly valuable addition to English life, bringing in new skills, experience, and wealth in many forms and providing new links across local and distant seas. Thus southern England in general and London especially emerged as the vortex of the wider turbulence affecting all northwest Europe, and the coalescence of these several streams of foreigners with the great numbers of English alert to new possibilities resulted in "the most dynamic society in the Western World—perhaps on the entire globe," with direct implications for America:

The extraordinary mobility of the people of the United States in the present century is customarily interpreted as a uniquely American phenomenon, but that this is far from so is made overwhelmingly clear to anyone who studies the local histories of seventeenth century England. The beginnings of American mobility are in Stuart England.

And, we should add, in the Netherlands of the House of Orange.

Thus, the America created out of this sector of Europe was one of the many manifestations of an explosive new movement rather than the continuation of an old one analogous to the reconquista. The tumultuous religious, political, social, and economic developments that characterized the Reformation were at their greatest intensity in Northwest Europe at just this time. Their suppression in France and Flanders helped to make London and Amsterdam centers of supercharged vitality while turning France toward the Iberian model of a centralized imperial system of state and church and ending Antwerp's primacy in European commerce. Among the countless evidences of social disruption emanating from the Reformation none was more portentous for America than the thousands of refugees: individuals, families, whole groups gravitating from a thousand localities into this intensifying urban commercial nuclear region. Dislodged from old patterns, such persons were forced to create new ones and they were made increasingly aware, by governments who wanted to get rid of them, entrepreneurs who wanted to make use of them, or their own kind who wanted to assist them, of America as a possibility for resettlement. Although the great impulse toward America from this corner of Europe does not begin as part of a religious movement and is only sporadically and intermittently dominated by cohesive religious groups, the prominence of persons carrying these new religious identities—those first Huguenots in Brazil and Florida, Separatists and Puritans, Flemish and Walloons (and Scottish Presbyterians in Ulster)—becomes a major feature. They are the most readily visible groups among the larger body of "vexed and troubled Englishmen" and others who would in time create something very new in a New World.

Whereas the great characterizing feature of Iberia was a formalized system of conquest, that of northwest Europe was a flexible system of commerce. Nurtured along the Baltic and North Sea coasts and various inland districts of specialized production, intensified seasonally in the trade fairs at regional crossroads, this system—through continual expansion and elaboration—had by the sixteenth century brought the whole of Europe into a primary commercial focus on the narrow seas of the northwest. It was a system of many parts, created and manipulated by individuals, families, syndicates, and guilds, rather than by kings and princes. That was the critical difference in this emergent capitalism: it operated internationally beyond the control of any one political ruler and without centralized authority of any kind. While it normally served to provide reasonably regular flow of an increasing range of goods to a growing population, it was inherently speculative and opportunistic, adaptable and expandable, for it operated, fundamentally, on the basis of private self-interest and thus it had participants ready to venture on any possibility of a new means to profit.

When Flanders and the Netherlands became part of the vast imperial federation under Charles V there was momentarily a direct political linkage between this Northwest capitalist system and the intercontinental geopolitical structures of

Iberia. As the financial burden of empire increased, the wealth of America, Africa, and Asia flowed in ever-larger proportions from Seville and Lisbon on to Antwerp and other northern financial centers, while at the same time the Flemish (a cosmopolitan term including those from merchant colonies, such as Italians and Sephardic Jews, as well as local Germanic peoples) infiltrated key commercial centers throughout the Spanish and Portuguese imperial networks. In the revolt against the constrictions of Charles's cumbersome structure the direct political link was broken but many informal (and often illegal) connections remained. The rapid shift from Antwerp to Amsterdam demonstrated the great adaptability of this capitalist system, and compressed by the new geopolitical boundaries but empowered by the newly intensified nationalism, northwest Europeans moved out upon the oceanic stage to challenge the Iberians anywhere on the globe.

Harnessing the deep philosophical and emotional drives of nationalism and religion to the old European zest for predation and profits created a powerful thrust but did not in itself provide an efficient instrument for implanting European civilization on American shores. The Dutch and the English were splendid at seafaring but had no well-tested formula for conquering and planting. And here we should note that Ireland was not quite analogous to those lesser Atlantic islands so pertinent to the Iberian advance. While it is commonly assumed that "Ireland and privateering were the battlefields on which Englishmen won their spurs as colonizers and seamen," they proved themselves much more readily on the sea than on the land. For the English never really completed their struggle to conquer and assimilate this great Celtic isle, and thus Ireland was no simple stepping-stone nor proving ground and it was surely in some degree an obstacle, an intervening opportunity that absorbed energies, manpower, and capital that might have been applied more directly and sooner to America had the English had an unobstructed view to the west. Similarly, Quinn suggests that the effort and resources expended upon the seafaring obsession with the search for an unobstructed northwest passage around America "postponed the application of capital and personnel to the solution of the problems of North American settlement."

Thus the America created out of this northwest sector of Europe was necessarily more invention than extension. There was important continuity in the commercial emphasis, and many of the financial systems were adaptations of Italian precedents, but there was no indigenous system for the colonization and administration of conquered lands and there was no possibility of simply borrowing such a thing from Iberian predecessors and rivals, despite multifarious connections, because it would require not simply a set of tools but patterns of attitude and behavior deeply rooted in cultural character and experience. French and especially English and Dutch colonization were therefore far more experimental, diverse in type, and uncertain in result.

Thus there were two great source regions for two great impulses toward Amer-

ica. Distinct in specific character and timing, they are nevertheless broadly analogous in important ways, and to identify them as source regions is not only to bring into geographic focus some well-known historical patterns, but to suggest a type and point to the pertinence of cultural theory relating to a fundamental geographic question. That general question is: why do creative cultural movements begin *where* they do? The theory relates to the concept of a "culture hearth," defined as an area wherein new basic cultural systems and configurations are developed and nurtured before spreading vigorously outward to alter the character of much larger areas. In their fullest sense, these matters represent the geographer's part of the general problem of the origins of civilization, and of "civilizations" or macrosocieties, those vast geographical entities within which a distinctive form of culture shapes the lives of millions of people over centuries, such as Ancient Egypt, China, the Roman Empire, Western Civilization, and others on the controversial lists of such historical creations.

While there is as yet no commonly accepted general theory on the processes critical to the emergence of such phenomena, there is a diverse literature that tends to converge on certain basic conditions that seem to have provided extraordinary stimulus to cultural change. The clearest formulation is that of Carroll Quigley in *The Evolution of Civilizations* (1961), which focuses on the invention of a new "instrument of expansion" as the result of the "mixture" of two or more cultures. If our two European source regions of American enterprise are not necessarily culture hearths of great configurations on the world scale of "civilizations," they are nevertheless seats of creativity and vitality from which powerful forces initiated immense cultural change over large areas. It is therefore appropriate to assess, if only briefly, the applicability of this geographic theory to the origins of the European transformation of America.

Basic to the concept of "mixture" in the theory of culture origins is the adage that "isolation breeds stagnation, whereas contact fosters change." However, the kind of change required is not a mere borrowing by one culture from another, not a diffusion of elements but a compounding of new forms, a fusion which in its fullest expression may be called a cultural synthesis. Since every society has routine contacts with other societies along its borders, we may expect such radical change to come from some disruption of those routines, from some gross alteration that discredits old patterns and demands and opens up possibilities for new ones. The most obvious examples are cases of conquest followed by migrations, resettlements, and reorganizations, cases involving the penetration of peripheries and the imposition of contact at the edge or within the very core of the conquered state. An important corollary to this concept of cultural synthesis is that the greatest stimulus to change will come from contacts between societies of unlike but not grossly unequal levels of culture. We would expect, for example, that the Cas-

tilians would be far more stimulated by an encounter with the Muslims of Andalusia than with the Guanches of the Canaries.

In such adversarial encounter there is not only the stimulus of contact arising from the challenging display of a different way of life; there is also, to borrow a Toynbeean term, the "stimulus of pressures," arising from the challenge to survive the chronic threat to such marchland societies of subordination or extinction by a powerful neighbor. Such survival requires a high degree of social efficiency, putting a premium on skilled and courageous leadership, on social cohesion and esprit, on the employment of well-honed tools of political and military contest.

Such contacts and pressures may stimulate the creation of new systems and configurations, but the concept of a culture hearth implies the spread of these outward from the region of origin so as to transform a much larger area. In Quigley's formulation the creation of an "instrument of expansion" involves invention, saving, and investment; that is, it requires an incentive to find new and better ways of doing things, an accumulation of surplus wealth by some group that controls more than they wish to consume immediately themselves, and their application of that surplus to further creation and extension. In the longer view, such an instrument of expansion results in greater production of goods, a rise in the general standard of living, growth of population, an increase in knowledge and in artistic and philosophic activities, and an increase in territorial extent along with alterations in geographic structure to form distinct core and peripheral regions. We may characterize this process as the "stimulus of resource rewards," to denote a social system that generates an ongoing expansion of wealth rather than merely the episodic plunder of conquest. Such increases may come from the discovery and development of new resources, the application of new technology, or the organization of new systems of production and distribution.

Applying these concepts to the two source regions, one notes that the most obvious feature they shared was an unusual level of turbulence and disruption—warfare and conquests, persecutions and migrations—brought about by the confrontation of powerful and deeply antagonistic societies. Certainly the stimulus of pressures was apparent in the chronic encounter of Christians and Muslims and in the explosive hatreds of Protestants and Catholics, which upwelled with special intensity along the old Romano-Germanic borderlands. The stimulus of contact is equally clear in the Iberian case and recalls Dawson's emphasis upon the creative possibilities arising from "the coming of a new people into an old culture-field." Despite widespread expulsions, enough of the conquered population remained in Andalusia to introduce their conquerors to forms and levels of production and civilization beyond what they had known in Castile. In northwest Europe the relationship was more the reverse for the influx was of refugees rather than conquerors and it was they who stimulated new developments in what had been lesser

centers. Amsterdam, in particular, though a prosperous regional entrepôt, had been markedly conservative in commercial technique. However, it is less easy to specify such stimulus of contact here amidst the swirl of the Reformation than in the simpler confrontations of the reconquista.

Castile's "instrument of expansion" was its highly honed conquest system, a tested integration of military, administrative, economic, social, and religious parts. Each major conquest brought the stimulus of further contacts and fresh resources as well as the challenge of integrating additional regions and administering an enlarged whole. The convergence in Andalusia with Mediterranean seafaring resulted in fresh invigoration and possibilities. The outreach to America brought contact with an array of new peoples, including the greatest of its civilizations. In the high Valley of Mexico the Spaniards were once again a "new people coming into an old culture-field," and the stimuli of pressure and resource rewards were enormous. The Spanish adapted their Iberian system to the tasks of overseas continental imperialism with remarkable energy and success, aided greatly by the heavy mortality of their opponents. But the very nature of their instrument of expansion required a recurrent infusion of new wealth to propel it onto new ground. A centralized bureaucracy has an insidious tendency toward rigidity and stagnation, a tendency, in Quigley's terms, to convert instruments into *institutions*; that is, for agencies to work with decreasing efficiency toward their original purpose and with increasing emphasis upon maintaining themselves. Hence the need for periodic reform. The Spanish empire surged forward on the basis of initial plunder and the discovery of rich extractive resources, but the costs of sustaining such an extensive imperial system were enormous and any surplus was increasingly squandered on fruitless European warfare. Having seized the wealth of half the Americas in half a century the Spanish monarchy underwent a series of declared "bankruptcies" immediately thereafter; it couldn't meet its payments on borrowed money. On the American side, of course, the more fundamental creative work proceeded generation by generation in the long process of cultural synthesis within the culture hearths from which a distinct Mexican and a more general Spanish-American culture would emerge.


The Portuguese case had its own peculiarities and importance. The initial instrument of expansion was state-supported seafaring, starting notably with Prince Henry, with investments producing improvements in nautical technology and increases in geographical knowledge that eventually tapped sufficient wealth in tropical Africa and Asia to sustain an incentive to further investment and expansion. Portugal opened the way toward a truly global commerce, but its more infamous contribution was the creation of another instrument of expansion: the tropical slave plantation system. Drawing first upon Mediterranean and Mauretanian antecedents, tested on Madeira, then on a larger scale on São Tomé, and

finally, backed by the Cape Verde Islands–Senegambia procurement system and implanted on the massive stage of Brazil, it was a distinctive cultural synthesis developed within the new Atlantic World. It was a crude and costly instrument, requiring virgin ground and large annual replacements for its brutalized labor force, but it produced sufficient wealth to implant an expanding Portuguese America, and the capture of that colony by the Dutch provided the means to extend that system in new directions.

We may take that intrusion of the Dutch into Brazil as symptomatic of the character, the power, and the problems of northwest Europe's instrument of expansion. Drawing upon a long history of seafaring and commerce, including a critical infusion of Italian techniques, supported but not controlled by flourishing national states, at times focused and intensified by religious rivalries, commercial capitalism would prove to be an unusually creative and flexible instrument. Yet for decades its outreach to America was fruitless and fumbling. The basic fact was that private investment required relatively quick returns. Hence the frantic search for ready resources and the strong temptation to plunder. Colonization, even the establishment of a modest outpost overseas, proved to be extremely costly and therefore unattractive. Impelled by profits rather than empire, it was far easier to raise money to sail and seize the wealth already produced by the Spanish and Portuguese than to send shiploads of workers to try to extract something valuable from American ground. Whereas Spanish America was an imposed "normative order," for the Dutch and English "America was a business," and by 1630 the recent capture of the entire Spanish treasure flotilla and the extension of control over the Portuguese sugar-slave system were as yet more characteristic of northwest Europe's instrument of expansion than were Virginia, New Netherlands, New England, or New France. In the longer and broader view, of course, we may now see that northwest area and its nations as not only the source region for North American development but the culture hearth of the New Europe and the core-states of the modern world capitalist system.

9. Generalizations: Sectors and Circuits of the Atlantic World

The first European discoveries of wealth on the western rim of the Atlantic called into being two quite distinct maritime connections across the ocean to two utterly different Americas. The one trafficway led to Northern America, indeed a formidably northerly America of foggy seas, ice-scoured lands, and punishing winters, whereas the other led to Tropical America, a deceptive paradisaical America of green-mantled islands and perpetual warmth, but fragile in substance and lurking with the dangers of disease and storm. From these two thresholds Europeans



The North Atlantic World, c. 1630.

probed and pushed westward and inward upon the great landmass itself, and also laterally, northward and southward along the continental margins. In the broader view the creation of European North America was a geographical emanation from these two earliest oceanic axes.

The wealth of northern America lay ready to harvest in the teeming waters of the great banks, where according to a widely publicized remark attributed to Sebastian Cabot, there were "so great multitudes of certeyne bigge fysshes . . . that they suntymes stayed [his] shippes." By simple extension from Atlantic Europe or a westward swing from Icelandic waters the gathering of such riches

could be immediately undertaken by fishing fleets from Portugal and the Azores, Cantabrian and Basque ports, La Rochelle, Brittany, and Normandy, the Channel Islands, and the West Country. That the exact sequence, numbers, and changes in scale and proportion of these many groups remain so uncertain over so long a time is an indication of how diffuse and peripheral this activity was. It was an open commerce of hundreds of entrepreneurs projected from scores of local ports; it was by its very nature marginal to both continents; and it was a commerce in which traditional customs relating to fishing rights on the open sea quelled national assertions of dominance or claims to adjacent shores.

And so, too, its significance to a long sequence of American developments remains unappreciated. For in a very practical sense, one may say that every ship that sailed across the northern Atlantic in the 1600s was sustained by the experience and skills, the manpower and infrastructure, the assessments and visions developed from the routines of the Great Fishery. That is not surprising, considering that exploitation of this rich resource was one of the great economic activities of Europe during the latter sixteenth and the seventeenth centuries, an economic venture which every year lured hundreds of vessels across the ocean, drew upon and fostered seafaring support systems along much of the Atlantic fringe, and marketed its catch through a network that reached far into the European realm; thus it trained generations of mariners, employed thousands of craftsmen and suppliers, and involved families and friends, syndicates and whole communities in North American activities long before any Pilgrim or Puritan, Norman or Dutch colonist took root in American soil.

We can generalize a sequential geography of European exploitation of this northern sector, starting with the "wet fishery" on the unseen edge of the continent, followed by the shift to the summer shelter of a hundred rockbound anchorages and the assault upon the forest edge to build the flakes and fires for the "dry fishery"; thence through the straits on either side of this first-found land (if via Belle Isle, sailing unwittingly by the meager rubble where intrepid seafarers had implanted a Norse America five hundred years before) into the capacious compartment of the Gulf of St. Lawrence, especially attractive for its whales and the walrus on the sandy Magdalenes; next on past the cliffs of Anticosti, lying like a huge hull guarding the entryway, and riding the wind and tide up the Great River of Canada (whose broad flow must be powered by some immense continental reach or reservoir) still in pursuit of whales and cod, but pausing occasionally to trade for furs; then the transition in emphasis from fish to furs and the establishment of a trading post where the Saguenay offers the first break through the walls of this narrowing funnel; and soon on further skirting the Ile d'Orleans lodged in the very throat of this passageway, to set up a frontier entrepôt and bind two peoples into a single intercontinental system by which the furs from interior America would be sent to the fashionable marts of Europe (see figure 5 inset, above).

This entire thrust, reaching from the full breadth of the great banks through successive narrowings to the channel of the upper St. Lawrence, remained a singularly maritime operation, by which ocean vessels penetrated the continent a thousand miles from the open sea. It remained so because there was no wealth apparent in the ground itself. From the first contact after an oceanic crossing on up the great river as far as Quebec it all seemed well summed in Cartier's famous phrase: "the land God gave as his portion to Cain." Still farther upstream Indian fields came into view, but this scattering of riparian patches, apparently the northernmost edge of agriculture over against the endless boreal forest, offered little to lure European investors.

Lateral extensions from the fishery led, naturally, into markedly contrasting environments: northward along even more barren ice-scoured coasts and arctic seas; but southward into softer country, the cul-de-sac of Fundy and the muddy flats exposed by its enormous tides, a length of isle-studded granitic coast, and then a series of morainic estuaries, the broader lowlands of Massachusetts, and the great sandy hook of Cape Cod. The transitions to better ground and easier climate are neither sharp nor simple and geographically it is not inappropriate to see this complicated coastline as a southerly sector of Northern America, with many continuities in lands and seas and early activities. The European implantations here, so famous in the annals of America, in fact came out of a long succession of fishing stations, trading posts, mission sites, and colonization schemes. The Separatist flirtation with the Magdalenes and the deep West Country involvement underlying Sagadahoc and Salem are only the more obvious links. Even the Dutch, arriving late on the scene, sailed up the great trench of the Hudson to establish their first post as deep into Northern America as their oceanic system could carry them.

Thus, when we begin to assess the creation of America in its proper Atlantic context we see not only Newfoundland and New France but New England and New Netherland, all the many beginnings from Hudson Bay to the Delaware, as integral parts of a Northern America, each in some degree an emanation from this old annual harvest of the northern seas.

The other transatlantic connection was an exact opposite in several respects: a single route from a single port connecting to two portals on the American mainland, one the focus for the traffic of Mexico and the other for that of Peru; a rigidly controlled maritime axis of an enormous imperial system that asserted exclusive territorial rights to most of the American world (and in fact a system which had extended its reach on westward to the Philippines and its claim over the entire Pacific Ocean).

Nature's circulation of winds and waters carried the Spanish directly to the American tropics. They began in the islands, first on Hispaniola, central in the

Antillean chain; next to the adjacent large islands of Puerto Rico, Cuba, and Jamaica; then to the lesser isles, chiefly on the hunt for Indian slaves. But the European impact upon this American threshold was appallingly, almost incredibly, destructive, reducing the population from perhaps several million to a few hundred thousand in a single generation, and after 1521 this varied archipelago became a partially abandoned backwater as the lure of plunder and of labor and land and mines led to the creation of a far greater New Spain on the mainland, and Santo Domingo became a way station rather than the primary focus of empire. During the sixteenth century modest amounts of sugar, tobacco, hides, pearls, and salt were shipped from some of these tropical coastlands, but the primary value of this entire insular realm and its continental flanks of Florida and Venezuela-Guiana was to guard the annual fleets to and from Mexico and Peru.

That circulation of traffic of the famous Carrera de Indies reflected the broad simplicities of winds and currents and of the imperial system of official ports and passageways: sailing outward from Seville and Cádiz (the deep-water outport) to Las Palmas on Grand Canary, driven by the trade winds and north equatorial current across the Atlantic, threading the Lesser Antilles screen (most commonly by Mona or by Dominica Passage) to Santo Domingo, or sometimes without pausing there on to Vera Cruz or to Nombre de Dios, the Panamanian collection point for Peru (replaced in the 1590s by nearby Porto Bello). These were separate fleets, the one bound for Vera Cruz departing several months ahead of the Isthmian one. For the return, the Peruvian and Mexican fleets, having wintered in America, assembled at Havana, and, picking up the mighty flow of the Gulf Stream through Florida Strait, arched eastward, avoiding Bermuda and calling in at the Azores if desired or necessary, en route back to Cádiz and Seville. As French and later English and pirate attacks increased, this annual passage began to be made under armed convoy, and San Juan, Cartagena, and Havana were fortified as major naval bases.

Thus a Spanish Atlantic became firmly defined, not as a broad diffusion of ships across the ocean as in the north, nor a simple axis, but as a circuit along a relatively narrow routeway. Traveled by often a hundred or more vessels (with declines in numbers offset by increases in the size of ships), the annual volume and value of goods, though varying a good deal, tended toward a peak in the early seventeenth century. Until the 1580s outbound cargoes were chiefly grain, biscuits, olive oil, and wine, "which enabled these Mediterraneans exiled in the land of maize to keep up long-established eating habits." But increasing production of wheat and wine in America, decreasing creole prejudice against American cuisine, and the growing impossibility of sustaining such "economic lunacy" worked to replace such shipments with cloth and other manufactured goods from Italy and northern Europe. The return voyages of the famous treasure fleet laden with silver and gold,

but also carrying a considerable variety of produce from these tropical lands and seas, was vital to the ongoing life of the entire imperial structure, and became the most obvious exhibit of wealth in America to envious rivals.

There was another sector of the American tropics in Brazil that was part of still another transatlantic circulation. This Portuguese network began as a Euro-African connection and took on a special American dimension only as the Brazilian sugar-slave production system developed. Santiago in the Cape Verde Islands was the principal pivot within this traffic pattern, although as the demands in Brazil increased direct shipments from African supply stations became more common. Portuguese America was a large claim upon the map but in effect more a set of discrete local districts confined to the narrow coastal lowlands. In function it was more a maritime commercial enterprise than a close kin to the continental empire of Spain. When these two were forcibly married under a common emperor in 1580 the Portuguese were allowed to take shipments of slaves directly to Cartagena, and later to Vera Cruz and Havana. There had of course been widespread smuggling of Africans into Spanish America for many years, but heretofore legal imports had been under monopoly license to traders who normally purchased slaves from the Portuguese in Lisbon or the Cape Verdes and shipped them via the main flotillas from Seville or the Canaries.

Thus there were three oceanic systems extending Europe's reach across the Atlantic, one to Northern America and two to distinct national and geographical sectors of Tropical America. Although each was anchored upon separate bases, they were in fact drawn into the general European commercial system focused, primarily, during most of the sixteenth century, at Antwerp. Within the Atlantic the earliest two, the Northern and the Spanish systems, were essentially separate, touching only incidentally at the Azores, overlapping in a minor way in the participation of Portuguese and Basque mariners and shipbuilders in both. The two Iberian systems were more significantly interlocked, in old and close connections between Lisbon and Seville and of both of these ports with Madeira and the Canaries, and more fatefully in the supply of slaves to Spanish America, at first indirectly, later with the Cape Verdes as the principal link, by which almost from the very first Africa became bound ever more deeply and extensively into the Euro-American relationships.

But the seas were open to any who dared enter. The shipments moving along these oceanic routeways, and especially the trunk lines of the tropical empires, were the most obvious displays of ready wealth and a lure toward America, which proved irresistible to the deeply predatory and increasingly nationalist societies of northwest Europe. Lacking adequate organized naval forces, governments made willing use of privateers and gave tacit encouragement to pirates in the pursuit of national objectives. Given the powerful animosities unleashed by the Reformation

"the result was the creation of great areas of savage, unorganized conflict," with "an immense increase in the incidence of robbery and violence, spreading . . . southwards in the east Atlantic from the English Channel to the Guinea Coast and westwards to all the shores of America from the River Plate to Newfoundland." This preying of European upon European was an integral and important part of the transfer of European culture overseas and it increasingly entangled, altered, and complicated this basic sixteenth-century pattern of sectors and circuits in the Atlantic World.

The prospects for plunder produced some audacious forays celebrated in national and naval histories; lesser known but of greater significance were the more permanent intrusions of northwest Europeans into Iberian America and Africa. Such attempts to colonize and to develop or take control of commerce were mostly

an affair of innumerable small ships, obscure promoters and many anonymous seamen, so many particles in the unorganized drift across the Atlantic that slowly gathered momentum. . . . Few of the great merchants of France, England and the Netherlands took any serious interest in this sort of business, which was essentially a shipowner's trade—among the Dutch, for example, the Zeelanders were the main promoters, and among the French, the men of Dieppe.

The savage destruction of the Huguenot colonies in Brazil and Florida showed how dangerous it could be to encroach upon these Iberian empires, but it proved impossible to defend them entirely against the rising maritime powers of northwest Europe. There was an increasing leakage of commerce through the connivance of local officials in outlying areas, such as Venezuela and Maranhão, and although no actually colonized part of either empire was lost more than momentarily until the Dutch seizure of Olinda in 1629, there was no hope of preventing footholds in the Lesser Antilles, Guiana, and the northern flank beyond Florida. The English colonies at Roanoke and Jamestown were encroachments upon lands claimed by Spain, as the unrealized strategic program of Menéndez and the Jesuit mission on the James declared, and each site was selected and fortified by the English with that fact uppermost in mind. These implantations were an attempt to gain a portion of the American tropics. The Raleigh expedition of 1585 came by way of the Canaries and Hispaniola and picked up sugar cane and other crops for trial; the later Virginia promoters extolled a long list of anticipated tropical productions, and the type of tobacco that finally opened the way to wealth was a transplant from the West Indies. Only as experience lengthened was it realized how marginally subtropical the Chesapeake region actually was.

Permanent footholds gave rise to more regularized Atlantic traffic, and the English began to develop a North Atlantic circuit that in some degree bound together the West Indies, Virginia, New England, and Newfoundland, with Ber-

muda as a new alternative way station. But it was the larger Dutch syndicates that created the most impressive and profitable system, and did so by moving in more directly upon the Portuguese and the Spanish, first by punishing raids, then by actual seizure and rule of productive districts and strategic stations. By the mid-1630s they had conquered much of Brazil, held a number of outposts in Senegambia, and had rapidly taken control of much of the slave trade (they ousted the Portuguese from El Mina in 1637); they dominated the Guiana and Venezuelan coasts, and had set up Curaçao and St. Eustatius as major entrepôts of Caribbean commerce; and they had created a New Netherland along the Hudson, with minor outliers on the Delaware and Connecticut, tapping into the fur trade of Northern America. Furthermore, Dutch "sack" ships began to alter the routines of the Great Fishery, with their seasonal voyages to Newfoundland to buy rather than catch fish themselves.

Thus the Dutch became the primary maritime power of the Atlantic and superimposed their own patterns upon earlier ones. Emphasizing commerce much more than colonization, they became the principal agents of contact and diffusions around this Atlantic circuit, the most important of which would be the spread of Africans and of more efficient plantation and marketing systems. It was a Dutch privateer that brought the first Blacks to Virginia, and a Dutch company that first shipped African slaves into Northern America, for the purpose of helping erect the first public buildings of New Amsterdam. Influences from Dutch Brazil would be critical to the emergence of English Barbados and French Martinique as wealthy sugar colonies, and these islands would become important in the transfer of English and French planter societies onto the North American mainland.

As an imperial type this Dutch creation was a maritime commercial system more like its older Mediterranean predecessors of Venice and Genoa than its Iberian rivals in the Atlantic, a network of collection centers and strategic points along critical trafficways. Small islands lying off a productive mainland were the ideal geographic base for such a system: secured by a natural moat, easily defended by a small garrison yet readily accessible alike to river, coastal, and ocean vessels; a natural compound for slave or indentured labor; and an obvious unit for separate political administration. It was a geographic type of empire that was therefore fragmentary, shallow in continental impact, irregular in territorial hierarchy. Because a large share of the Europeans came as sojourners rather than settlers, assigned for a tour of duty or attracted by the hope of profit, it was a system that tended to foster spatial and class segregation rather than the integration of European and local peoples. Such geopolitical systems were also unusually flexible and unstable. One outpost might be substituted for another, and there was little hope of or desire to invest in the comprehensive control of all islands or coasts as the Spanish had attempted. Thus the English, French, and Dutch were piecing to-

gether such networks simultaneously in the same regions; they picked up neighboring islands and coastal segments, and together with the remnants of the Portuguese system and the bastions of the Spanish began to create a highly fragmented geopolitical pattern of indelible consequence to important sectors of this Atlantic rim.

To the modern eye perhaps the most striking feature of that Atlantic World up to 1630 was the lack of any real competitive focus or vigorous development in middle-latitude North America, the very lands most amenable to the direct transfer of European crops and systems of living. This sector, extending from the Delaware to southern New England, was apparently of little interest (so little, in fact, that in the latter 1630s the Swedish flag would be raised over a newly implanted colony on the Delaware portion of New Netherland with no significant reaction from the Dutch for years). Yet these were lands that could be described in familiar terms and praised as equal to the best at home. But that was precisely why they had so little attraction to the commercial capitalists of northwest Europe, for the trade such people thrived on was based on the complementarity of *unlike* regions. The greatest profits came from exotics, from commodities given value by special demands, relative scarcity, and lack of substitutes.

Since the production of the familiar staples of home gave no promise of great wealth, the promise of social rather than economic gain seemed the obvious alternative to those who wished to promote the development of this sector: the lure of land in large blocks, land for manors, patroons, or seigneuries, land to be held more as a measure of prestige than as a means to quick profits. The patroons of New Netherland were an early example of such an attempt to extend an age-old European social pattern across the seas. But these proved a weak instrument for it was easier to attract initial investment than actual patroons and tenants and the costs of development surpassed the means of most aspiring squires. However, there was yet another possible social connotation, latent particularly in these middle-latitude lands and given its first full expression in "New England": not the replication of England across the seas, but an England new in social possibilities for a whole body of people, a new kind of England, a departure from rather than a transfer of traditional patterns. It was the outreach of Calvinist Protestantism, foreshadowed in those abortive Huguenot colonies, initiated by the Separatists at Plymouth, and vigorously undertaken by the English Puritans that would provide a new and powerful impetus toward America, directed toward these very lands that had proved so marginal to more fully commercial interests.

By the 1630s the Atlantic World had begun to display a good deal more differentiation and complexity than it had only a few decades before. The annual harvest of the sea remained the paramount activity in northern America, but after a long informal testing period the fur trade was emerging as an attractive prospect of wealth from the land. The key indication was the willingness of substantial

entrepreneurs to invest in settlements in America, in small colonies supported in part by local produce rather than ephemeral outposts. It was a commerce dependent on the Indians and it was a geographically expansive system, which thereby spurred territorial rivalries among European nations and among their Indian allies. The English had formalized competitive imperialism in this sector by laying claim to Newfoundland in 1583, but only began to endanger the informal routines of the fishery by actual colonization thirty years later. The fur trade was basic to the initiation of Acadia, Canada, New England, and New Netherland. Emerging out of a swirl of commercial rivalries these imperial territories were not as yet very clearly delimited on the map, but English attacks upon Port Royal and Quebec and their proclamation of a New Scotland in place of Acadia were indications of a sharp intensification of European national interests in this nearest America. Furthermore, the presence of colonies of religious refugees in Massachusetts Bay, Plymouth, and New Netherland began to give a new regional diversity and a further divergence from the original and still basic commercial character of this broad thrust across the northern Atlantic.

In Tropical America imperial competition and new colonization had brought even more extensive change. The Spanish held firmly to their enormous continental empire, but had lost control over its outer Atlantic approaches and thereby over the security of its own imperial trunk line. Less notable at the time but more basic was the founding of English, French, and Dutch colonies and the beginnings of their own versions of tropical planter societies. In the subtropics a distinctly English empirical creation was taking shape out of the desperately difficult attempt at commercial colonization by the Virginia Company. The Portuguese had developed their part of Tropical America into the most productive commercial sector of the American seaboard, sustained by an expansive slave-procurement network along the West African coast. This African littoral was an important commercial area even apart from its primary human product, supplying gold, ivory, spices, medicinals, and dyewoods, as well as a still-valued amount of São Tomé sugar. In the 1630s the Dutch moved in upon both ends of this Portuguese equatorial axis, and other northern Europeans soon followed to introduce a new set of unstable and complicated patterns of maritime imperialism.

Generalizing more broadly once again, we can see that the two great thrusts out of the two creative source regions carried two distinct versions of European civilization across the ocean, initiating a Catholic imperial America in the south and a Protestant commercial America in the north. But these direct extensions were increasingly caught up into larger Atlantic circuits binding together four continents, three races, and several cultural systems, complicating and blurring the processes of extension and transfer. Distance and time, encounter and environment, events and experience would surely imperil any comprehensive replication

of European society. Already two great mutations had appeared, the mestizo-creole society of Hispanic America and the mulatto-creole society of Luso-Afro-America, and there were hints of others in the tropical colonies of northwest Europe and in the refugee colonies in northern America. By 1630 Europe held dominion over every seaboard sector and huge portions of the interior. America had become incorporated into the routine concerns of European nations, but this was not simply an enlargement into a Greater Europe. It is better seen as a new Atlantic world. The ocean had become the "inland sea of Western Civilization," a "new Mediterranean" on a global scale, with old seats of culture on the east, a great frontier for expansion to the west, and a long and integral African shore.

10. Generalizations: Geographic Models of Interaction

The Atlantic World was the scene of a vast interaction rather than merely the transfer of Europeans onto American shores. Instead of a European discovery of a new world, we might better consider it as a sudden and harsh encounter between two old worlds that transformed both and integrated them into a single New World. Our focus is upon the creation of new human geographies resulting from this interaction, and that means those developing not only westward upon the body of America but eastward upon the body of Europe, and inward upon and laterally along the body of Africa. For it is certain that the geography of each was changed: radically on the American side, with widespread disruption of old patterns and imposition of new ones; more subtly on the European side, with new movements of people, goods, capital, and information flowing through an established spatial system and slowly altering its proportions and directions; slowly and unevenly on the African side, making connections with existing commercial systems but eventually grotesquely altering the scale and meaning of old institutions.

In search of guidance in thinking about so complex a matter, we may begin by recalling our simple formulation of *seafaring*, *conquering*, and *planting* as a common sequence in the European outreach to and encroachment upon America. These can be further subdivided to recognize some recurrent general patterns:


1. *Exploration*: reconnaissance, the search for basic information, the discovery of possibilities.
2. *Gathering*: exploitation of obvious coastal resources, such as fish, ship timbers, and salt, by extension of routine activities.
3. *Barter*: commercial opportunism, trade with local populations for exotic goods, testing for further development.
4. *Plunder*: brigandage, military opportunism, sometimes involving forays into the interior, seizing whatever might have value in European markets.

5. *Outpost*: fixing a point of commercial exchange; a commitment to overseas investment and assignment of personnel to overseas residence.
6. *Imperial Imposition*: assertion of formal claim and power over American territory; assignment of governor, soldiers, missionaries, and other agents of European state and society.
7. *Implantation*: transfer of Europeans as permanent settlers and initiation of self-sustaining colony.
8. *Imperial Colony*: logical development from imperial imposition and implantation—transfer of full complex of institutions, a selected transplant of European culture tending toward expansion and divergence from the home country.


It must be emphasized that this is not a rigid sequence. In some localities there were no immediate resources awaiting harvest; barter and plunder might be, often were, intermixed, alternating as phases of the same enterprise; formal imperial assertion might be simultaneous with the establishment of a commercial post and extensive colonization. But the list does offer a useful perspective on a general process in which we can view the first five categories as a *prelude*, a set of activities that required nothing more than seafaring backed by modest commercial interests and that could be readily discontinued without major loss or disruption. (See figure 9.) In contrast, subsequent categories clearly imply more substantial encroachment, made possible by conquering and planting to form a firm European nucleus upon lands overseas. (See figure 10.)

As soon as we begin to relate these phases to specific cases variations among the many transatlantic enterprises will be discernible, most notably in the differences among those of the several European states. But some of those differences are so commonplace that it is useful to stress for a moment the opposite. Columbus and the earliest Portuguese in Brazil were as involved in exploration, gathering, barter, plunder, and the establishment of speculative outposts as were the northern Europeans in northern America. Only in the later phases do these thrusts create rather different kinds of American colonies, reflective of their markedly different cultural origins.

Moreover, if we are to stress interaction we must broaden our perspective to bring both sides of the Atlantic into view and try to envision the simultaneous changes in Europe and America through this sequence, as diagramed in figures 9 and 10. The first four phases share fundamental similarities on both sides of the Atlantic: requiring only modest resources, they can be projected from small European ports; and being inherently sporadic and intermittent because of the lack of an obvious commercial infrastructure to connect with on the American side, they result in no fixed point of sustained contact. The commercial outpost marks an important step. In Vance's terms, the "impulse to trade" had now spun a thin



9. Transatlantic Interaction: Prelude Phases.



10. Transatlantic Interaction: Fixation Phases.

strand between "points of attachment" on either side of the ocean, which would likely channel subsequent developments very markedly. Because such a distant outpost required a considerable investment it was likely to be a projection from a major port wherein entrepreneurs had ready access to capital and mercantile connections, although it might well draw upon the energies and earlier experiences of smaller ports as well; and because such an outpost became the focus of a newly constituted economic area it might have widely ramifying social and cultural impact. Imperial imposition expresses a formal link between commercial enterprise and political power, the axis between port and court (which were not always in the same city). On the American side it created a cluster of facilities representing government and church as well as commerce. Implantation begins to draw more fundamentally upon European hinterlands, which become catchment basins for the recruitment of colonists and thereby become bound by ties of kith and kin with these new overseas creations. On the American side such migration will lead inevitably to some degree of disruption of the indigenous population.

We can envision, therefore, general patterns of change spreading inwardly upon each continent as the strands linking them across the Atlantic thicken and multiply. It is a sequence broadly of increasing magnitude of change: in the number of people directly engaged and indirectly affected, in the number and scale of institutions extended across the sea, in the volume of capital invested and goods transported. Geographically it is a sequence involving shifts in location and scale that can be generalized within hierarchical territorial systems: from Atlantic-facing provincial ports or even lesser fishing harbors to larger commercial and political centers, with a concordant shift in the size of hinterlands affected. The obvious anomalous case was the state-enforced monopoly system of Spain, which after 1503 kept all American traffic rigidly focused on Seville. The internal commercial networks of all these European states in some degree reflected the agrarian medieval central place system, modified by the presence and function of a few major international entrepôts. The outreach to America augmented this latter mercantile dimension, in the need to expand the provisioning of ships and settlements overseas, to produce goods for trade, and to process new imports. Beyond these major ports, we might logically expect that the impact in Europe of American operations, including the spread of information, recruitment of personnel, attraction of capital, and marketing of produce, would move through these national systems in hierarchical patterns. We can be sure that there would be anomalies, and no doubt any attempt to identify and measure the amount of such geographical change in European cities, settlements, and systems would be as elusive and controversial as the long-pursued attempt to measure the relative impact of American bullion upon the European economy, but it does seem a worthy corollary task.

On the American side, except in those few regions where Europeans superim-


posed themselves upon dense and deeply rooted Indian societies, as in central Mexico, there was no similar structured network of localities for European-induced change to move through. Such change began of course from the moment Europeans and Americans caught sight of one another: their mutual discovery creating new perceptions of the world of men, exciting new hopes and fears. Long before Europeans took firm root in North American soil contact had effected important changes. Disease was the most devastating, resulting at times in sudden and drastic demographic deformations of Indian societies.

When the isolation of the New World was broken, when Columbus brought the two halves of this planet together, the American Indian met for the first time his most hideous enemy: not the white man nor his black servant, but the invisible killers which those men brought in their blood and breath.

Barter could initiate economic change as Indians responded to supply new markets and to do so with the help of new tools obtained from Europeans. It is important to emphasize that there was no obvious imbalance in these early commercial relationships. Contact opened new opportunities that persons on each side warily but avidly explored, seeking whatever advantage might be gained for themselves. Completely separate cultural development had created an inherent basis for commerce: each side had utterly ordinary goods that proved amazingly attractive to the other, allowing both to regard the exchange as highly profitable. Because the basis of such commerce was new and because there was no network of market towns, specialized system of carriage, or separate class or clans of traders already in place along the American seaboard, the establishment of a European outpost was by its very nature a transforming intrusion, which could not but have major social as well as economic effects. But the more fragmented and less stable political and economic geography of Indian groups would lead to a less systematic and symmetrical diffusion of such impacts over any considerable territory than in Europe.

A powerful European sense of superiority was latent in all such encounters. Europeans initiated these contacts and any resisters to their intrusions were regarded as enemies. An imperial relationship was therefore assumed and its overt assertion marked a critical stage and level of impact, for, however effective in fact at any particular place and time, imperialism implies political subordination, military coercion, economic exploitation, social stratification, and often some attempt at religious alteration and other programs to enforce cultural change. The influx of Europeans as permanent settlers would reinforce and insure the perpetuation of such pressures. Resistance, conflict, and dislocations were sure to follow, but there were marked differences in geographic results. In general, three basic geographic types (see figure 11) were common:

1. expulsion of the native population from the colonized area and the creation of a firm frontier of separation between the two peoples, as in Virg




11. Transatlantic Interaction: Three Colonial Types of Relationship with Indigenous Peoples.

2. benign articulation of the two peoples at a point of exchange, each group operating largely within a separate territory but bound together in an encompassing economic system, as in Canada; and
3. stratification within a single complex society, exhibiting varying degrees of racial and cultural mixture and fusion, as in Mexico.

Much has been written about the differing racial attitudes of the English, French, and Spanish as important causes of such patterns, but it would appear that different local circumstances, and especially basic differences in imperial objectives, were more critical. Miscegenation was apparent in all areas of encounter, but a fusion of peoples and cultures arose from the assumption of a comprehensive imperial purpose in the European outreach. An incomplete account of Spanish landholders in Hispaniola recorded 146 of 392 living there with their wives, of whom ninety-two were Spanish and fifty-four Indian; dated 1514, this report suggests how early such blending got under way where colonization was an integral part of a system of conquest. Racial attitudes are conditioned by cultural experience; they were more a product of the formative phases of this new encounter in America than rigid assumptions transferred from Europe.

One further variation must be added to these generalized patterns of geographic change wrought around the Atlantic rim. West Africa was bound into this European outreach from the very first and Africans became the principal population in some American sectors. The circuits of the slave trade were more triangular than directly reciprocal across the Atlantic, so that the main cultural impacts were those of Europe upon Africa and Africa upon America, with very little American influence directly eastward upon Africa (the introduction and spread of selected tropical crops being the most obvious). Because a traffic in slaves had long existed within Africa and because Iberians were well acquainted with the use of coerced labor, the critical prelude took place quite rapidly on the Atlantic islands, in Senegambia, and on São Tomé, and the sugar-slave plantation system could be implanted in Tropical America without long experimentation.

On the African side the common pattern was that of a European station on an island or peninsula, supervised by a few officials and agents, adjacent to or near an entrepôt manned largely by Europeanized mulattos and Blacks, which was in turn the base of an African-controlled slave procurement system reaching into the territories of vulnerable tribes in the interior. Here disease defeated ambitious imperial designs and the European presence was minimal, marginal, and unstable, so that cultural imports were primarily those selected by, rather than imposed upon, the Africans. Many detailed features remain obscure, but the cultural and economic incentives introduced and magnified by the European-controlled Atlantic system may be presumed, from the sheer scale of the trade, to have altered the human geography of West Africa in major ways, although with marked regional




12. The Transatlantic Slave Trade System.

variation, since some of the more powerful centralized societies, such as Benin and Dahomey, resisted participation.

On the American side slaves were marketed through established networks linking major ports, regional centers, and rural districts. Wherever they were used in any number they of course created a highly visible African presence on American soil, a presence recurrently reinforced by fresh importations. More subtle were their influences upon their European masters and upon any residual local Indians. Miscegenation was inevitably a widespread, ongoing feature among such closely associated and interdependent peoples. The human geography of these societies tended toward increasing complexities of stratification and segregation arising from racial and cultural mixtures, from the emancipation of individuals, from the emergence of unsupervised clusters of Africans in cities and marginal districts, and eventually from outlaw societies of renegades who fled to freedom in remote hinterlands. On a broader scale, of course, the Europeans controlled the spread of this African impact, but as servants, artisans, and laborers Blacks were taken in

A. Fishing Canoes of Mina 5. or 600 at a time



13. Slave Trade on the Guinea Coast.

This remarkable seventeenth-century panorama displays one of the most intensely developed sectors of the Euro-African trading system. Within a stretch of about twelve miles five European forts cling to the mountainous margins of the Gold Coast: Mina (Elmina), the first great Portuguese bastion, seized by the Dutch in 1637 and so elaborated that John Barbot noted "it looks as if it had been made for the dwelling of a king, [rather] than for a place of trade in Guinea"; St. Iago, a Danish fort (c. 1670) on an adjacent height; Cabo Corso (Cape Coast), which the English had taken from the Dutch in 1664 and made into the chief base of the Royal African Company; half a mile on, Manfrou (Amanfro), established in 1600 as a base for the Danish African Company; and Mouree (Mouri) where the Dutch began trading in 1598 and built Fort Nassau in 1624. These substantial fortifica-

small numbers to many ports and districts and thereby exerted in some way the influence of Africa along almost the full length of the American seaboard.

Thus we can attempt to envision these changes as the effects of a single vast spatial system, a transoceanic network ever enlarging its extent and capacity, lacing itself ever more deeply and complexly into the body of Europe, encroaching ever more powerfully and drastically upon the lands and peoples of America, and

B. Trade Canoes carrying Slaves on Board of Ships at Mouree



tions reflect not only these European rivalries but the insecurity of all Europeans, who operated on this coast only on the sufferance of local rulers. The canoes featured in the foreground emphasize another essential African role in the system. There are no good harbors along this coast; ships must stand well offshore and be served by African boatmen skilled in coping with the heavy surf. The original of this sketch dates from about 1680 when John Barbot was trading along here with the French Royal African Company (which had no forts in this area). His manuscript "A Description of the Coasts of North and South Guinea" evidently first appeared in print in 1732 in an English translation published in London as part of Churchill's *Collection of Voyages and Travels*. This print is a photograph of Johannes Kip's engraving in Volume V of that work.

drawing ever more extensively and destructively upon the societies of Africa. The great primordial circulation of the Atlantic had become the medium for an immensely complex and widely tamifying exchange of plants and animals, goods and money, men and women, tools, ideas, and entire systems of activity. By 1630 the impact was already enormous and the balance heavily weighted in favor of Europe. To use Wallerstein's formulation, the American and African sectors were parts of a

new *periphery* of an emergent *core* now "firmly located in northwest Europe, that is, in Holland and Zeeland; in London, the Home Counties, and East Anglia; and in northern and western France," a relationship that heralded the birth of "the modern world-system" of capitalist economy. A key to that structure was the creation of a "geographical division of labor" in which some form of coercion was used in outlying areas for the production of valued goods, which products and the profits therefrom flowed to the capitalist groups who controlled the vigorously diversifying developments in the states of the core region. Such a pattern on a world scale can be traced to the Portuguese use of African slaves for sugar production on the Atlantic islands, not because that system was wholly new in form but because it was the first step in a vast geographical extension of such an economy.

Our principal focus is upon societies rather than economies, and here, too, the Europeans were the shaping agents. The social life and demographic patterns of a large portion of American and parts of Africa had been deeply disrupted and deformed. Disease, warfare, slave hunting, and cruel exploitation had nearly depopulated most of the West Indies, extensive stretches of the mainland coast, and some inland regions. Africans now formed the main population of several colonies and were present in nearly every European-developed locality in the American tropics and subtropics. Europeans, already many different kinds of Europeans, dominated by power if not everywhere by numbers from Labrador to the Río de la Plata.

Such an attempt to envision an Atlantic World ensnares us in an even larger web and leads logically to the necessity of seeing it as only part of a global system. We must hold that awareness of scale ever in our minds, but our major concern is with America and it is now time to shift our focus from this general system in this oceanic arena and look more closely at the regional variety of peoples and places created from these European footholds in North America and on islands closely related to North American developments.

PART TWO IMPLANTATIONS: THE CREATION OF AMERICAN DIVERSITY



As a single story the recruitment, settlement patterns, and developing character of the American population in the preindustrial era . . . covers a long period of time. . . . Further, it involves population movements over a vast geographical area—an area stretching from the bleak island of Foula off the west coast of the Shetlands at the latitude of Greenland to the Lunda Kingdom deep in equatorial Africa, from the Baltic port of Flensburg and from Görlitz on the German-Polish border to Natchez and Pensacola. And, finally, the problems it involves lead naturally beyond history itself to other disciplines as they relate to history: anthropology, demography, and particularly, cultural geography.

Bernard Bailyn

- p. 442 Crèvecoeur, *Letters*, 39
 La Rochefoucauld Liancourt, *Travels*, vol. 1, 26
- p. 444 "as much cultivated as France": La Rochefoucauld Liancourt, 396
- p. 449 "fluid, individualistic, flamboyant": Calhoun, "A Troubled Culture," 99
 Russo, *Families and Communities*, 104
- p. 451 "men of little faith": Main, "American States," 2
- p. 453 Volney, *A View of the Soil and Climate*, 17-18

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The following list of works used in the preparation of *Atlantic America* is divided according to the four parts of the book. Of course some studies were pertinent to more than one part, but these are listed where first used and are listed again in a subsequent part only if specifically mentioned by author or title in the text of that part.

There are in addition certain materials of general importance that deserve mention at the outset. No one who is not a trained specialist in American colonial history could prepare a book of this sort without incurring a heavy debt to the writers of major university-level textbooks. Fortunately the writing of these remarkable distillations and assessments is a distinguished tradition in American history and new works by leading scholars appear every year. I shared the good fortune of thousands of Americans in having been given my first ordered view of the history of my country with the aid of Morison and Commager, *The Growth of the American Republic*. This famous work has been in print for more than fifty years. Of course it has been revised time and again, but I have kept my well-worn third edition within easy reach as a handy reference on innumerable details. While preparing *Atlantic America* I always had several more current texts at hand as well, and occasionally I paused and looked over a batch of new ones. I probably learned something from every one, but I came to rely most heavily on Bailyn et al., *The Great Republic* as an up-to-date general reference. I

made similar use of an older copy of another hardy perennial of somewhat more specialized focus: Billington's *Westward Expansion*. One becomes also deeply grateful to be able to tune in on historians talking to one another in sophisticated review essays, such as the rich compendiums edited by Greene and Pole and by Michael Kammen.

On the more geographic side I found Theodore Miller's *Graphic History of the Americas* the most useful among several historical atlases and Herman Friis's maps of colonial populations and John Reys's splendidly illustrated book on historical city plans to be major aids. Reproductions of a wide variety of maps of the various American colonies are now available in many forms, including inexpensive individual sheets. I shall cite only one collection and one study of maps and mention the twenty sheets published by the United States Constitution Sesquicentennial Commission as items I referred to most often. Over many years I have found the state guidebooks produced by the Federal Writer's Project of the W.P.A. in the late 1930s and early 1940s to be rich mines of information on localities. They are too numerous and well known to warrant separate listing, but I do wish to testify in general to their value and fascination.

Full citation of the individual items mentioned above together with a few others of general utility are given immediately below.

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